A Comparison of DSM-IV and DSM-5 Panel Members' Financial Associations with Industry: A Pernicious Problem Persists

Lisa Cosgrove,Sheldon Krimsky

doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001190

Abstract

Lisa Cosgrove and Sheldon Krimsky examine the new competing interest disclosure policy of the American Psychiatric Association (APA) and report that DSM panel members still have considerable financial conflicts of interest.

Highlights

All medical subspecialties have been subject to increased scrutiny about the ways by which their financial associations with industry, such as pharmaceutical companies, may influence, or give the appearance of influencing, recommendations in review articles [1] and clinical practice guidelines [2]
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)-5 panel members are required to file financial disclosure statements, which are expected to be listed in the publication, and the American Psychiatric Association (APA) has made a commitment to improve its management of financial conflicts of interest (FCOIs)
We have reported elsewhere on industry relationships with DSM-5 task force members [18]

Summary

Introduction

All medical subspecialties have been subject to increased scrutiny about the ways by which their financial associations with industry, such as pharmaceutical companies, may influence, or give the appearance of influencing, recommendations in review articles [1] and clinical practice guidelines [2]. DSM-5 panel members are required to file financial disclosure statements, which are expected to be listed in the publication, and the APA has made a commitment to improve its management of financial conflicts of interest (FCOIs). N The American Psychiatric Association (APA) instituted a financial conflict of interest disclosure policy for the 5th edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). The APA has made the disclosure of FCOIs of DSM panel members more transparent, there are important gaps in the current policy that need to be addressed: 1. The current APA disclosure policy does not require panel members to identify speakers’ bureau membership but rather cloaks it under ‘‘honoraria.’’ We would argue that this exclusion allows for commercial interests to be reflected in the revision process: there is no evidence to suggest that because money comes in the form of a large ‘‘unrestricted’’

Conclusion

Findings

Author Contributions