A Comparative Study of Coalition Governments in Post-Conflict Societies

Abstract

The establishment of coalition governments as transitional arrangements on nations bedeviled by conflicts has become an automatic solution in many countries of the world. Multiparty electoral processes or processes that include as many contesting parties and interests as possible have for years been dubbed as important building blocks for peace and smooth transition, especially in countries devastated by civil wars or violence. This chapter argues that that single party governments make governing straightforward and keep the executive/legislatures fully accountable to voters as the incumbent governing party has nobody else, but itself to blame for mediocre performance. While multi-party governments involve bargaining informed by compromises on the interests of voters and coalition bargaining are fashioned more on the interests of the leaders and actors in the bargaining table. In the Third World countries, especially those experiencing violence or civil wars, exogenous superpowers mainly from the West are quick to broker coalition governance with externally imposed rules as panacea for progress. The chapter further argues that externally imposed coalition formations and rules more often than not benefit the interests of the outside superpowers than the domestic interests of citizens. While endogenously crafted, formulated, and implemented coalition processes are more likely to benefit domestic interest of the people than outside powers. The chapter seeks to contribute to the current literature on the formation of coalition governments as transitional arrangements and peace brokers for parties or groups in conflict. The chapter used desktop research to solicit information from peer reviewed journals and scientific research papers.