A Comparative Legal, Economic and Structural Analysis of Challenging Shareholders’ Resolutions Under Turkish and English Legal Systems

Abstract

English law system and Turkish law systems have different approaches to protection of shareholders and challenging shareholder resolutions. These differences have important historical, economic background reasons and also economic and legal outcomes. In order to understand reasons for these differences an economic as well as a legal and cultural analysis should be conducted. Difference in the corporate ownership structures of these legal systems is the primary underlying reason; effective ex ante contractual minority protection mechanisms under English legal system is the second reason, and finally differences in legal nature of shareholder rights under these law systems is the third reason for the different approaches of these legal systems towards challenging shareholder resolutions. It is also important to analyze the legal and economic efficiency of the two legal systems in terms of challenging shareholders resolutions. Considering applicable legal institutions regarding challenging shareholders resolutions, it is possible to say that the English legal system is economically more efficient however due to the uncertainties and complexities involved, the English legal system can be characterized as legally less efficient.