A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Korean and Japanese Clientelism

Abstract

Clientele networks are differently structured across nations, depending on the political institutional setup and the configuration of political and social forces. The political institutional setup, which is cross-nationally different, determines where clientele networks are formed, how extensive they are and how long they can persist. The configuration of political and social forces, which varies over time, defines who takes the lead in clientele networks and how effective they are for producing policy effects. A comparison of Korean and Japanese clientelism suggests that the Korean case represents a form of national-level, defensive, non-cumulative and high political-risk clientelism, while the Japanese case illustrates a form of local-level, cumulative and low political-risk clientelism. Korean clientelism is not a copy of the Japanese variant. Based on this analysis, the author suggests that not every social organisation is functional for democratic governance. He also points out that the gradual process of disintegrating clientele networks is on the move.