Abstract
A Commentary on Pokropski's Functionalist Reading of Husserlian Phenomenology.
Highlights
In his recent study, Pokropski argues that Dreyfus’s famous cognitivist reading of Husserl’s theory of mind is partly misleading, as a strong computationalism
The strong computationalist reading of Husserl, according to Pokropski (2020, p. 871), holds that (1) the theory of noema is a sort of adumbration of contemporary computationalism, such as Fodor’s representational theory of mind (RTM); (2) this mean, that the noema functions as a mediatory entity; (3) the noema do not require a mind’s physical realization
Pokropski’s original idea and his key insight here is to develop an alternative functionalist reading of Husserl’s phenomenology. He holds that Husserl applies an explanatory strategy of decomposition which resembles the method of functionalism
Summary
Institute of Philosophy, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland Keywords: functionalism, transcendentalism, eidetics, eidetic variation, reduction, noema Specialty section: This article was submitted to Consciousness Research, a section of the journal Frontiers in Psychology Citation: Płotka W (2021) A Commentary on Pokropski’s Functionalist Reading of Husserlian Phenomenology. Front. Psychol. 12:614842. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.614842
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