Abstract
ABSTRACT A recent study analytically investigates the stability of a public good coalition assuming unlimited types of players that differ in benefits and costs of providing public goods. They show that, if there is a positive covariance between benefit and cost parameters of coalition members, the size of a stable coalition cannot be larger than three. This comment further proves that if the above assumption is made to all players, coalition members always have high abatement benefits and costs.
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