Abstract

Nishimura, Nakajima, and Kiyota (2005) analyze the entry/exit behavior patterns of Japanese firms during the 1990s and find that relatively efficient (high total factor productivity (TFP)) firms exited while relatively inefficient (low TFP) firms survived during the banking-crisis period of 1996-97. They conclude from this finding that the natural selection mechanism (NSM) apparently malfunctions during severe recessions, but we offer a much more plausible interpretation: the NSM continued to function effectively even during this period, but aberrant banking practices (in particular,forbearance lending(evergreening) and the forcible withdrawal of loans and/or the reluctance to lend) caused a shift in the type of natural selection from directional selection to disruptive selection, with the most efficient (highest TFP) firms as well as the least efficient (lowest TFP) firms being favored and firms of intermediate efficiency and TFP being selected against.

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