A combinatorial-probabilistic analysis of bitcoin attacks

Abstract

ABSTRACTIn 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto famously invented bitcoin, and in his (or her, or their, or its) white paper sketched an approximate formula for the probability of a successful double spending attack by a dishonest party. This was corrected by Meni Rosenfeld, who, under more realistic assumptions, gave the exact probability (missing a foundational proof); and another formula (along with foundational proof), in terms of the Incomplete Beta function, was given later by Cyril Grunspan and Ricardo Pérez-Marco, that enabled them to derive an asymptotic formula for that quantity. Using Wilf-Zeilberger algorithmic proof theory, we continue in this vein and present a recurrence equation for the above-mentioned probability of success, that enables a very fast compilation of these probabilities. We next use this recurrence to derive (in algorithmic fashion) higher-order asymptotic formulas, extending the formula of Grunspan and Pérez-Marco who did the leading term. We then study the statistical properties (expectation, variance, etc.) of the duration of a successful attack.