A collective goods model of pluralist political systems

Abstract

In The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson strongly criticized the work of the analytical pluralists, particularly with regard to the fairness of the outcomes in a pluralist political system.' The foundation of his criticism is his assertion, based on a Cournot model of group behavior, that large groups are unable to compete in the political marketplace.2 If this is the case, and if, to use Bentley's phrase, 'the balance of group pressures is the existing state of society,' then one can expect this balance to be badly skewed in favor of small, special interests and against large, general interests. Recent analyses using the same model have shown that Olson's assertion concerning the behavior of large groups is not in general true, and that contrary to his assertion, the relationship between group size and the amount of a public good provided is an increasing one.3 In light of these results, it seems appropriate to re-examine in detail the properties of a model of a pluralist political system based on the theory of collective goods. This paper contains such an analysis of pluralist political systems, and assesses the asymmetries in outcomes which arise from a variety of sources. Among the sources of asymmetry are variation in group size, wealth, influence, intensity of preferences, and the degree of organized pursuit of group goals. The discussion below suggests that variation in system parameters greatly affects the properties of outcomes and that it is necessary to specify more carefully than is usually done the characteristics of a particular pluralist system before assessing the fairness of its outcomes.