Abstract
Following the levels of intentionality and semiosis distinguished by the Semiotic Hierarchy (a layered model of semiosis/intentionality), and the distinction between original agency (without the use of artefacts) and enhanced agency (the prosthetic incorporation of artefacts), we propose a model of an agency hierarchy, consisting of six layers. Consistent with the phenomenological orientation of cognitive semiotics, a central claim is that agency and subjectivity are complementary aspects of intentionality. Hence, there is no agency without at least the minimal sense/feeling of agency. This perspective rules out all artefacts as genuine agents, as well as simple organisms, since it is highly unlikely that e.g. bacteria have any first-person perspective. Using this model, we review and assess recent proposals on the nature of agency from cognitive science, and neuroscience, and draw conclusions on how to incorporate aspects of them within a synthetic cognitive-semiotic framework.
Highlights
Given that our phenomenon of study is that of agency, we propose a general definition that is meant to be applicable to “biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind”, to quote the subtitle of Thompson (2007)
Consistent with the level-based approach of Niño (2015), but more closely related to a cognitivesemiotic theory known as the Semiotic Hierarchy (Zlatev, 2009, 2018; Zlatev & Konderak, in press), and recent proposals to distinguish between basic and enhanced agency (Mendoza-Collazos & Sonesson, 2021), we present an agency hierarchy, where higher levels presuppose, but go beyond, lower ones
We review here three approaches to agency that all reflect recent trends in cognitive science, where the mind is seen as enactive in organism-environment interactions, according to which even simple organisms such as bacteria exhibit a basic kind of agency (Barandiaran et al, 2009), or as extended beyond the body into artefacts, as in Material Engagement Theory (Malafouris, 2013)
Summary
As with many philosophical notions, the concept of agency is contentious and ambiguous. From the standpoint of the agent, the three basic conditions are those of animation (self-movement), situatedness and attention.2 According to this theory, the agent necessarily has a (conscious or unconscious) goal, an agenda. Niño’s approach aims to integrate different levels of agency, from simpler forms with a basic survival agenda, to the cognitive agency of animals capable of self-awareness, to even higher forms typical of human beings. While inspired by such ideas, we take several steps back, and address agency from the standpoint of cognitive semiotics, which is not a particular theory, but a new science (in the broad sense of the term) dedicated to the study of meaning (
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