Abstract
We defend two theses: (1) Knowledge how and knowledge that are two distinct forms of knowledge, and; (2) Stanley-style intellectualism is neuro-psychologically implausible. Our naturalistic argument for the distinction between knowledge how and knowledge that is based on a consideration of the nature of slips and basic activities. We further argue that Stanley’s brand of intellectualism has certain ontological consequences that go against modern cognitive neuroscience and psychology. We tie up our line of thought by showing that input from cognitive neuroscience and psychology, on multiple levels of analysis, cohere in supporting the distinction between two separate forms of knowledge. The upshot is a neuro-psychologically plausible understanding of knowledge.
Highlights
Knowledge is commonly seen as consisting of two forms
An important thing to notice here is that the agent has the correct propositional content and is normally able to apply it, but, for some reason, their knowledge that and their knowledge how came apart and they acted in some sense successfully: they performed actions that belong to their basic action repertoire—i.e., they poured milk instead of juice, they did not start singing into the jug or jump up and down—on a different propositional content than they meant to act on
They do something different from what they intended; the performance is guided by their knowledge how. This reveals a divide between the knowledge that actively guides behavior: the knowledge how that the agent applies sub-consciously; and the knowledge how they intend to guide their behavior in the first place, which they are under the illusion of acting on even as they slips. We argue that this divide between two levels of knowledge how operative in the slip case has no parallel when it comes to knowledge that
Summary
Knowledge is commonly seen as consisting of two forms. The knowledge how to do something, such as riding a bike, and the knowledge that something is the case, such as that Reykjavík is the capital of Iceland. Ryle [1,2] set an enduring and influential modern debate in motion by discussing the relation between the two forms. Numerous different approaches for investigating knowledge have been discussed and promoted, the most common focus has been on the concept knowledge, and Stanley’s argument centers on a semantic approach. This said, he explicitly discusses cognitive scientific evidence and claims that it supports his position [3,7]. This approach is motivated to assess Stanley’s claim using a naturalistic approach where the natural phenomenon knowledge, such as science presents it, is seen as being of primary interest.. In defense of our view, we put forth and defend the following two theses: (1) knowledge how and knowledge that should be seen as two distinct forms of knowledge, and (2) intellectualism is neuroscientifically and psychologically implausible
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