Abstract

Summary In this article, the phenomenon of delayed recall for traumatic memories is considered, and the recovered memory interpretation and the false memory interpretation for this phenomenon are articulated. A major tenet in the false memory interpretation is the claim that delayed recall of traumatic memories results from the suggestive planting of memories for events that did not actually occur. However, this view assumes a very powerful construct of suggestibility. In this chapter, recent research from our laboratory on the suggestibility of memory is reviewed to assess if the construct of suggestibility is sufficiently robust to account for this effect. In particular, four constraints on the suggestibility of memory are discussed and related to memory for traumatic events. These constraints are (a) the familiarity of the original event, (b) whether the original event is consistent or inconsistent with expectations, (c) whether the suggestion is to change or to plant a memory for the original event, and (d) the plausibility of the suggested false event. Research on each of these constraints is presented. Based on this cognitive analysis of the recovered memory/ false memory debate, it is concluded that suggestibility does not appear to be a sufficiently strong cognitive construct to explain the delayed recall phenomenon.

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