A coalition approach to trade policymaking in the United States: the fast-track authority fiasco of 1997 and the approval of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with China in 2000

Rodrigo Fagundes Cezar,Carlos Eduardo Carvalho

doi:10.1590/0034-7329201700101

Abstract

Abstract This article proposes a framework centered on coalitions between the executive, the congress and interest groups for the analysis of the US trade policymaking process. Such a framework is focused on two main concepts, “willingness to bargain” and “pivotal actor”. The work advances two main hypotheses related to the ability of pro-free-trade actors to come to an agreement and anti-free-trade actors to effectively oppose trade liberalization. Two case studies are undertaken in order to check the plausibility of such hypotheses: the fast-track fiasco (1997) and the approval of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with China (2000).

Highlights

The study of the domestic determinants of foreign policy preferences has consolidated as a reflection of the dissatisfaction with structural explanations (Waltz 1979; Krasner 1976)
One of the most known approaches to the study of trade policy, to which the understanding of how openness to international trade affects domestic alignments is central, (Rogowski 1989; Alt and Gilligan 2000; Frieden and Rogowski 1996), does not take into consideration the preferences of the executive and the congress and focus solely on specific domestic civil society preferences. This model is focussed upon understanding the formation of domestic coalitions, it does not emphasize transversal coalitions among political actors of distinct levels, which, we claim, are crucial for understanding the “big picture” of a fragmented trade policymaking process
We assume that a coalition is the decision unit that will define whether or not a given trade policy is approved (Hagan et al 2001)

Summary

Introduction

The study of the domestic determinants of foreign policy preferences has consolidated as a reflection of the dissatisfaction with structural explanations (Waltz 1979; Krasner 1976). One of the most known approaches to the study of trade policy, to which the understanding of how openness to international trade affects domestic alignments is central, (Rogowski 1989; Alt and Gilligan 2000; Frieden and Rogowski 1996), does not take into consideration the preferences of the executive and the congress and focus solely on specific domestic civil society preferences This model is focussed upon understanding the formation of domestic coalitions, it does not emphasize transversal coalitions among political actors of distinct levels, which, we claim, are crucial for understanding the “big picture” of a fragmented trade policymaking process. We present “plausibility probes” (George and Bennett 2005) of the hypotheses generated by using the case studies of Clinton’s failed attempt to renew the fast-track authority in 1997 and the approval of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with China in 2000

A coalition-based approach in a fragmented decision-making process

Coalitions in the United States trade policymaking process: two cases

The fast-track authority fiasco of 1997

Conclusion