A Clay Person. The Promises of Moral Bioenhancement

Abstract

The debate on moral bioenhancement—expressed in the acronym MB-is in fact influenced by the requirements of both the market and scientific research and philosophy must avoid an ideological use of its arguments. The moral phenomenon is highly complex and it does not seem likely that MB will be able to produce the desired effects without undermining human freedom, which, however, is a constitutive element of personal morality. There is the risk that MB perceives the human being as “something” to be perfected to the detriment of being “someone” to respect and not to manipulate. If MB were to guarantee the exercise of freedom it would not differ from plain and simple enhancement of human capabilities, and therefore there would be no assurance that an enhanced human being might be extra good, and not, instead, extra evil. In addition there are values associated with the plurality of moral experience that risk being compromised and lost if the trust in human relations as a growth factor of moral personality were to be replaced with a trust in pharmacy and in technology, creating a new form of impersonal dependency.