A Chinese model of cross-control of administrative power: a case study based on the reform of administrative reconsideration and the non-lawsuit administrative execution system

Abstract

ABSTRACT In China, it is difficult for an independent monitoring body to control administrative power. For power control mechanisms to work, the established power structure in China must be fully considered. The administrative reconsideration reform and non-lawsuit administrative execution reform, which have received much attention in China in recent years, show two different ways of thinking about power control. The dual-defendant system in the administrative reconsideration reform has a distinctly local character, whereas the non-lawsuit administrative execution reform tends to be more in line with the world’s mainstream model of independent judicial supervision. Comparing their results, the dual-defendant system has achieved an unexpected success, whereas the non-lawsuit administrative execution system has suffered setbacks. Summarising the successes and failures in practice revealed that the cross-control mode of administrative power embodied in the dual-defendant system in administrative reconsideration reform has cleverly configured the pressure of responsibility on different supervisory bodies, prompting each body to actively perform its supervisory duties. In contrast, the independent monitoring model emphasised in the non-lawsuit administrative execution reform neither strengthens the pressure of responsibility on monitoring entities nor brings actual benefits to them, so the reform is ultimately unsustainable. The conclusions of this comparison may provide lessons for similar institutional designs in China or other developing countries.