A Challenge to Ludwig Von Mises's Theory of Probability

Abstract

This paper offers a challenge to Ludwig von Mises's theory of probability. Ludwig von Mises's theory of probability is described as being different from his brother Richard von Mises's dogmatic frequentist theory of probability, but still very much flawed. It is claimed that Ludwig von MIses never articulated an explicit definition of probability, and that he ought to have adopted and defended a subjective definition of probability. A subjective definition of probability fits in with the rest of his praxeological, methodological, and ontological system. If Ludwig von Mises had adopted a subjective definition of probability, moreover, this would have undercut many of his claims about probability. In particular, a subjective definition of probability would have undercut his claim that numerical probability cannot be applied to singular cases, and his famous division of probability into the subcategories of class and case probability.