A Causal Bayes Net Analysis of Glennan’s Mechanistic Account of Higher-Level Causation (and Some Consequences)

Alexander Gebharter

doi:10.1093/bjps/axz034

Abstract

Abstract One of Glennan’s ([1996]) most prominent contributions to the new mechanist debate consists in his reductive analysis of higher-level causation in terms of mechanisms. In this article I employ causal Bayes nets (CBNs) to reconstruct his analysis. This allows for identifying general assumptions that have to be satisfied to get the analysis working. I show that once these assumptions are in place, they imply (against the background of the CBN machinery) that higher-level causation indeed reduces to interactions between component parts of mechanisms. I also briefly discuss the plausibility of these assumptions and some consequences for the mechanism debate.

Highlights

2 Glennan’s Analysis of Higher-Level Causation 3 Causal Bayes Nets 4 Reconstructing Glennan’s AnalysisAlexander GebharterA Causal Bayes Net Analysis
Glennan ([2002], [2011]) argues that counterfactuals stating what would happen under interventions can be used to achieve knowledge of the causal relations among component parts at the fundamental physical level
D vance relations to the higher-level behaviours of interest, while others do not. l Let us assume that the mechanism underlying H1 consists of three constitua tively relevant parts, while the mechanism responsible for H2 consists of two. in We model H1’s component parts with the variables L1, L2, and L3 and H2’s components with L5 and L6

Summary

Conclusion

1 Introduction ft Mechanisms play an important role for many sciences such as biology, medicine, a and neuroscience. Glennan ([2002], [2011]) argues that counterfactuals stating what would happen under interventions can be used to achieve knowledge of the causal relations among component parts at the fundamental physical level He emphasises, that though interventions can be used for such epistemic purposes, they do not provide a basis for a thorough metaphysical analysis of the concept of causation.[5] Another problem with Glennan’s mechanistic analysis might be that it seems to reduce higher-level causation to causation at the fundamental physical level.

Reconstructing Glennan’s Analysis

Consequences for the Mechanism Debate

Mechanisms and inter-level causation

Interventions into mechanistic hierarchies