Abstract
The design of the Controller Area Network (CAN bus) did not account for security issues and, consequently, attacks often use external mobile communication interfaces to conduct eavesdropping, replay, spoofing, and denial-of-service attacks on a CAN bus, posing a risk to driving safety. Numerous studies have proposed CAN bus safety improvement techniques that emphasize modifying the original CAN bus method of transmitting frames. These changes place additional computational burdens on electronic control units cause the CAN bus to lose the delay guarantee feature. Consequently, we proposed a method that solves these compatibility and security issues. Simple and efficient frame authentication algorithms were used to prevent spoofing and replay attacks. This method is compatible with both CAN bus and CAN-FD protocols and has a lower operand when compared with other methods.
Highlights
Automotive architecture systems have become increasingly complex and diverse
When our method is implemented in CAN-flexible data rate (FD), we assume that the maximum length of the data field will not exceed 62, and two extra bytes contain the message authentication code (MAC) will be inserted into the end of the data field
Due to the limitation that the data field of a CAN frame is limited to 8 bytes, we use a novel message authenticate code to replace the original cyclic redundancy check (CRC) field in the frames of the CAN protocol
Summary
Automotive architecture systems have become increasingly complex and diverse. In response to people’s demands related to automotive safety, comfort, and entertainment systems, numerous electronic components have been added to vehicles. The first type of error is bit error, wherein the transmitter compares the transmitted data with the data presented to the bus to check for inconsistencies; if consistencies are detected, an error frame is sent out directly after the message is transmitted. This error detection mechanism can only detect SOF, DLC, data, and CRC errors. Attacks can exploit loopholes in these systems or communication protocols, enabling individuals to access the vehicle remotely and take complete control of it [13] This poses a serious risk to vehicle safety. Remote access attacks are mainly distinguished into denial-of-service attacks and message tampering
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