A broadcast-based key agreement scheme using set reconciliation for wireless body area networks.

Abstract

Information and communication technologies have thrived over the last few years. Healthcare systems have also benefited from this progression. A wireless body area network (WBAN) consists of small, low-power sensors used to monitor human physiological values remotely, which enables physicians to remotely monitor the health of patients. Communication security in WBANs is essential because it involves human physiological data. Key agreement and authentication are the primary issues in the security of WBANs. To agree upon a common key, the nodes exchange information with each other using wireless communication. This information exchange process must be secure enough or the information exchange should be minimized to a certain level so that if information leak occurs, it does not affect the overall system. Most of the existing solutions for this problem exchange too much information for the sake of key agreement; getting this information is sufficient for an attacker to reproduce the key. Set reconciliation is a technique used to reconcile two similar sets held by two different hosts with minimal communication complexity. This paper presents a broadcast-based key agreement scheme using set reconciliation for secure communication in WBANs. The proposed scheme allows the neighboring nodes to agree upon a common key with the personal server (PS), generated from the electrocardiogram (EKG) feature set of the host body. Minimal information is exchanged in a broadcast manner, and even if every node is missing a different subset, by reconciling these feature sets, the whole network will still agree upon a single common key. Because of the limited information exchange, if an attacker gets the information in any way, he/she will not be able to reproduce the key. The proposed scheme mitigates replay, selective forwarding, and denial of service attacks using a challenge-response authentication mechanism. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme has a great deal of adoptability in terms of security, communication overhead, and running time complexity, as compared to the existing EKG-based key agreement scheme.