A British Profession of Arms: The Politics of Command in the Late Victorian Army, by Ian F. W. Beckett

Abstract

Reviewed by: A British Profession of Arms: The Politics of Command in the Late Victorian Army by Ian F. W. Beckett Richard Fulton (bio) A British Profession of Arms: The Politics of Command in the Late Victorian Army, by Ian F. W. Beckett; pp. xviii + 349. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2018, $39.95. Ian Beckett is perhaps the most important, and certainly the most prolific, historian of the British military writing today. Starting with his 1973 handbook on the Duke of Marlborough's campaigns, he has published and reprinted some forty histories of the British Army, accounts of campaigns, and biographies of important military figures. But his work on the nineteenth- and twentieth-century British military is, I believe, his most important. Victoria's Wars (1974), Riflemen Form: A Study of the Rifle Volunteer Movement, 1859–1908 (1982), Johnnie Gough, V.C.: A Biography of Brigadier-General Sir John Edmund Gough, V.C., K.C.B., 1871–1915 (1989), The Amateur Military Tradition 1558–1945 (1991), The Victorians at War (2003), and now A British Profession of Arms: The Politics of Command in the Late Victorian Army are increasingly nuanced studies of the Victorian and early twentieth-century British military, and are important contributions to our knowledge both of the inner workings of the army and its place in the larger culture. As the title indicates, this is a study of the British military as a profession. Beckett reminds us that all professions are defined by a few fundamental characteristics, including a body of specialized knowledge, appropriate training, specific skills, and mentorship. In nineteenth-century Britain, membership in a profession also generally assumed membership in a particular social class that was apart from the middle class of captains of industry and trades, and that shared "a common social, educational, and cultural background" with the landed aristocracy and the gentry as well as with other late-Victorian professions (4). While the Cardwell reforms of the early 1870s had fanned the hopes of a host of army critics for a better and more competent, popular, and professional army, junior officers in particular (as well as some very conservative regimental commanders) resisted reforms that meant adopting key elements of professionalism, such as learning the increasingly specialized knowledge of land warfare and acquiring appropriate specialized training. Many were perfectly content acquiring professional knowledge in the way officers always had done, through serving with a variety of columns, flying columns, expeditions, and field forces in the hundred or so imperial military adventures following the sobering experience of the Crimean War. And they were mentored by the competing "rings" led by Sir Garnet Wolseley (Commander in Chief of the Forces from 1895 to 1901) and Sir Frederick Roberts (Commander in Chief of the Forces from 1901 to 1904), which taught them the social tools for professional advancement (which were not unlike the social tools in all professions): politicking, undermining, bullying; jobbery, flattery, [End Page 308] obsequiousness; and bribery and one-upmanship (74). Beckett provides copious examples of all the various aspects of professionalism in the military that mirrored those of the established professions. Beckett walks the reader through the personal and professional realities of major commands: the expenses of entertaining in Ireland and Crete, the career-killing commands in Africa, the political infighting between the British Army and the Indian Armies. He describes personal issues: Wolseley in particular had a list of officers whom he despised and would neither appoint nor promote. Sir H. H. Kitchener, Sirdar of the Egyptian Army and leader of Anglo-Egyptian forces in the Nile Campaign of 1896 through 1898, would not give Winston Churchill a post because he resented the political pressure Churchill's mother was applying. Beckett describes the importance of having the right wife: Sir Henry Evelyn Wood's wife Paulina was so socially inept that Wood's career was stalled until after her death. Prince George, the Duke of Cambridge, was clear that in selecting men for certain commands, a "very nice wife" was a key element in the appointment (132). Beckett describes in detail the politics of advancement involving both formal and informal maneuvering, through confidential requests of Queen Victoria or Edward, Prince of Wales...