Abstract

Whatever trade arrangement the UK decides to adopt with the EU post-Brexit, the UK government will have authority over fisheries policy. Under the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), after many years of stock decline, there has been a recent stabilisation and even increase in stocks. However, the CFP is not an effective way for managing fishing rights. Other countries such as Iceland have more effective policies that lead both to sustainable management and also reduce conflict between different interests. The UK should adopt a tradable quota share system whereby quotas are allocated as a share of the annual total allowable catch in perpetuity. Such a system mirrors the way in which property rights on land encourage sustainable farming. Under such a system the quota-holders have an incentive to agree the total allowable catch to maximise sustainability. In-shore fisheries might be better managed in other ways with self-management often being more sustainable than government regulation. Having determined the principles by which the system should operate, there are a number of practical difficulties that need to be addressed. These are important issues, but need not get in the way of the development of an effective and sustainable property-rights based system for allocating fishing rights

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