Abstract

With the rapid development of mobile networks, there are more and more application scenarios that require group communication. For example, in mobile edge computing, group communication can be used to transmit messages to all group members with minimal resources. The group key directly affects the security of the group communication. Most existing group key agreement protocols are often flawed in performance, scalability, forward or backward secrecy, or single node failure. Therefore, this paper proposes a blockchain-based authentication and dynamic group key agreement protocol. With our protocol, each group member only needs to authenticate its left neighbor once to complete the authentication, which improved authentication efficiency. In addition, our protocol guarantees the forward secrecy of group members after joining the group and the backward secrecy of group members after leaving the group. Based on blockchain technology, we solve the problem of single node failure. Furthermore, we use mathematics to prove the correctness and security of our protocol, and the comparison to related protocols shows that our protocol reduces computation and communication costs.

Highlights

  • With the rapid development of mobile networks, the secure transmission of data is no longer limited to both parties in communication, but is required in group communication.Group communication can transmit messages to all group members with minimal resources [1].This is because the sending of the message only needs to be broadcast once within the group, instead of sending the same message to all group members one by one, which results in a significant increase in communication efficiency

  • According to the research of [7,8], we found that most of these protocols have the following defects: (1) performance: before the group key is negotiated, mutual authentication is usually required between group members, which may consume much of the computation and communication costs; (2) scalability: the protocol cannot efficiently handle the joining or leaving of group members, which results in the poor scalability of the protocol; (3) forward or backward secrecy: it is difficult to guarantee the forward or backward secrecy of group members after joining or leaving the group, such as [9]; (4) single node failure: since most existing protocols store the registration information of all group members in a single node, these protocols are vulnerable to the problem of single node failure

  • In our protocol, when group members join or leave a group, they only needs to update the parameters of an adjacent group member, which improves the scalability of our protocol

Read more

Summary

Introduction

With the rapid development of mobile networks, the secure transmission of data is no longer limited to both parties in communication, but is required in group communication. According to the research of [7,8], we found that most of these protocols have the following defects: (1) performance: before the group key is negotiated, mutual authentication is usually required between group members, which may consume much of the computation and communication costs; (2) scalability: the protocol cannot efficiently handle the joining or leaving of group members, which results in the poor scalability of the protocol; (3) forward or backward secrecy: it is difficult to guarantee the forward or backward secrecy of group members after joining or leaving the group, such as [9]; (4) single node failure: since most existing protocols store the registration information of all group members in a single node, these protocols are vulnerable to the problem of single node failure These protocols are not suitable for MEC.

Related Works
Network Model
Threat Model
Bilinear Pairing
Proposed Protocol
Initialization Phase
Registration Phase
Mutual Authentication Phase
Group Key Generation Phase
GN Join Phase
GN Leave Phase
Internal Attacker Detection Process
Correctness Analysis
Simulation Based on the ProVerif Tool
GN Capture Attack
Replay Attack
Forward Secrecy after a New GN Joins
Backward Secrecy after a GN Leaves
Single Node Failure
Computation Cost
Communication Cost
Comparison with Related Protocols
Conclusions

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.