Abstract
We study the impact of property rights on the terms of cross-border syndicated loans. By comparing loans by foreign lenders from countries covered by bilateral investment treaties (BITs) to loans from non-covered countries, we isolate and quantify the impact of property rights against government expropriation on loans. We find that stronger property rights lead to a lower cost of debt, larger loans, larger syndicates, less collateral, and fewer covenants. Our results are stronger in countries with a history of government expropriations and robust to methodologies accounting for the endogenous nature of BITs and for the simultaneous determination of loan terms.
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