A Bipolar Balance of Power

Abstract

IN THE BOLD AND INCISIVE LANGUAGE that we have all come to admire in his work, Paul Schroeder insists he is not merely tinkering with the definition of the term balance of power but discarding the concept altogether, at least as an interpretation of the Vienna settlement. The settlement's essential power relations hegemonic, not balanced, he says, and further, this is what made the system work. In this respect, he adds, the Vienna settlement of 1815 differed from all other settlements in modern times, most particularly the predatory balance of power politics practiced in the eighteenth century.' Before challenging this thesis, as this rejoinder is meant to do, it is important to acknowledge broad areas of agreement with the picture Schroeder paints of hegemonic politics. First of all, his critique of the conventional explanations for relative stability is essentially sound though not entirely free of inconsistencies. War weariness there certainly was but unevenly distributed. Britain was physically unscathed and financially sound; Russia in 1815 was just reaching the peak of its military build-up, which in turn depended heavily on British subsidies and foreign enlistments; Prussia actually favored war over Saxony; Austria was bankrupt, but that was its normal condition. Nor does war weariness explain why peace reigned after 1815 but not long after many other debilitating conflicts such as the War of the Austrian Succession. Schroeder likewise doubts that a common fear of revolution drove fearful monarchs to huddle together in a common front against their rebellious peoples. This version of the Concert, parading the Holy Alliance and the Troppau Protocol as its prime exhibits, became liberal, and nationalist orthodoxy until well into this century; and until just recently it continued to reign in the countries of the former eastern bloc, representing the Congress of Vienna as a ruling-class conspiracy, a classic demonstration of a class struggle across international boundaries.2 Schroeder's refutation is valid; in making it, however, he comes close to crediting war weariness after all. European leaders, he writes, were not driven to seek lasting peace in 1815 because they feared revolution. They did so because