A Binational State? God Forbid!

Abstract

When I come to contradict the theses of my friend Azmi Bishara, I am conscious of a certain irony. While Bishara, a Palestinian, albeit a citizen of Israel and indeed a self-declared candidate for the prime ministership of this state, mercilessly attacks Yasir Arafat and his strategy, I, an Israeli, albeit an old friend of the Palestinian cause, support them wholeheartedly. This would appear to be a battle with reversed fronts. I have no quarrel with most of Bishara's analysis in the winter 1999 issue of the Journal of Palestine Studies. Indeed, great parts of it run parallel to my own articles on the situation. My quarrel is with his conclusions. His description of the Israeli-Palestinian-American minuet at each stage of the negotiations is exactly right, except for one small detail: after each of these frustrating forth-and-back movements, something remains in Palestinian hands. Bishara has a lot of contempt for such little gains. Not I. Throughout the twentieth century, this was a major tactical difference between the Zionists, who always accepted what they were offered and worked for more, and the Palestinians, who always rejected because it was not enough. History has proved the Zionists right. Their slogan, dunam after dunam, goat after goat, led to victory, while the maximalist approach of all Palestinian leaders until Arafat led to much more than defeat. It brought about a historic tragedy for the Palestinians. The result is the very of power that Bishara bemoans. Israel has an overwhelming superiority on all fronts-military, political, economic. There is no way of changing this imbalance dramatically. What is needed is a strategy that will achieve partial gains and consolidate them, while fighting for more. Arafat has created such a policy and adhered to it with remarkable tenacity. He has achieved outstanding results. Forty years ago, when Fatah was founded, there was no Palestine on the map; even the existence of a Palestinian people was denied. Those few (including myself) who advocated in the 1950s the creation of a Palestinian state were ridiculed. Today, an important part of the Palestinian people lives under an internationally recognized Palestinian self-government, whose many obvious faults are insignificant-and hopefully temporary-compared to the fact of its very existence, as an embryo of a full-fledged state. This is not an ideal situation. But compared to the starting point of this long march, a tremendous advance has been achieved. It is the job of the statesman to define the line of at each stage of the struggle. Arafat was right when he decided, in the early 1960s, against much opposition, that the main effort must be armed struggle. Sad to say, only violence put the Palestinians on the map again. He was also right when he decided, after the October 1973 war, that the main effort must now be Palestinian-Israeli accommodation. That has already given the Palestinians a territorial base, however small. I believe that he is