A Bidding Methodology by Nash Equilibrium for Finite Generators Participating in Imperfect Electricity Markets

Abstract

This paper presents an application of finite n-person non-cooperative game theory for analyzing bidding strategies of generators in a deregulated energy marketplace with Pool Bilateral contracts so as to maximize their net profits. A new methodology to build bidding methodology for generators participating in oligopoly electricity market has been proposed in this paper. It is assumed that each generator bids a supply function. This methodology finds out the coefficients in the supply function of generators in order to maximize benefits in an environment of competing rival bidders. A natural choice for developing strategies is Nash Equilibrium (NE) model incorporating mixed strategies, for solving the bidding problem of electrical market. Associated optimal profits are evaluated for a combination of set of pure strategies of bidding of generators, and payoff matrix has been constructed. The optimal payoff is calculated by using NE. An attempt has also been made to minimize the gap between the optimal payoff and the payoff obtained by a possible mixed strategies combination. The algorithm is coded in MATLAB. A numerical example is used to illustrate the essential features of the approach and the results are proved to be the optimal values.