Abstract
The East Prussian Campaign of August 1914 is famous for the intercept of Russian clear-text radio messages by German radio operators. English language accounts have long credited German radio intelligence with providing the information that brought on the Battle of Gumbinnen. However, German and Russian language documents and accounts tell a different story. This paper argues that radio intelligence did not provide the information that led to the Battle of Gumbinnen. Instead, the origins, conduct and aftermath of the battle resulted from intelligence errors that caused the German command authorities to misunderstand the location, structure and intentions of the opposing Russian forces.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
