A bargaining model with asymmetric information for a single supplier–single buyer problem

Abstract

Banerjee’s joint economic lot size (JELS) model represents one approach to minimizing the joint total relevant cost of a buyer and a supplier by using a joint optimal order and production policy. The implementation of a jointly optimal policy requires coordination and cooperation. Should the buyer have the market power to implement his own optimal policy as that one to be used in the exchange process no incentive exists for him to choose a joint optimal policy. A joint policy can therefore only be the result of a bargaining process between the parties involved. The supplier may make some sort of concession such as a price discount or a side payment in order to influence the buyer’s order policy. A critical assumption made throughout in supply chain literature is that the supplier has complete knowledge about the buyer’s cost structure. Clearly, this assumption will seldom be fulfilled in practice. The research presented in this paper provides a bargaining model with asymmetric information about the buyer’s cost structure assuming that the buyer has the power to impose its individual optimal policy.