A backhanded assault on academic freedom

Abstract

Censorship and prepublication reviews of scientific work have long been associated with countries such as China, North Korea, and Iran. Scientists in much of the western world consider the freedom to exchange ideas and the dissemination of new knowledge as basic rights. And yet, the UK and US government are now making moves to restrict this freedom in the name of protecting national security (see Lancet 2002; 359: 679). The US government has quietly withdrawn declassified documents related to biological weapons from the public domain and is drafting new guidelines about limiting information in the methods section of some scientific publications. Agencies, including the National Institutes of Health, are said to be considering their policies on reporting restrictions. These are regrettable steps backward into a dark age of scientific secrecy. The atrocious scientific activities during World War II and the Cold War era, conducted under the cloak of national interest by government agencies, such as plutonium injections into human beings, human radiation experiments, and the Porton Down chemical warfare experiments, are powerful reminders that secrecy may lead to abuse of human beings by the very organisations that purport to protect them. It has taken half a century until efforts were made to uncover these wrongdoings, which were kept classified partly to avoid government embarrassment and potential legal liability. Many new measures that restrict civil liberties were introduced in the USA after Sept 11 with remarkably little opposition. Those concerning science and academia are defended–even by some academics–on the grounds of safeguarding the public against misuse of scientific information. However, historical examples show that misuse and treason are just as, or perhaps even more, likely to come from within the circles privileged with access to classified information than from an outside “enemy” using publicly available information. One must now at least accept the possibility that the mailing of anthrax spores to media and government offices last year was the work of a former US government scientist familiar with secret state-sponsored research. In the UK, the Export Control Bill, which had its first reading in June, 2001, and will be next discussed on March 4, could potentially have similarly damaging effects. The Bill as currently phrased would allow government officials to scrutinise research before publication and impose transfer controls over scientific publications and over so-called intangibles, such as e-mails containing ideas and, for example, presentation slides for scientific talks. Although intended to broaden the control laws to cover electronic exports in line with US and European regulations, its wording is such that academic freedom might be seriously and arbitrarily impeded. Reassurances by officials that they have no plans to exercise sweeping powers to vet research papers sound hollow. Universities UK, representing vice-chancellors and principals of all UK universities, is concerned—and rightly so. There is no reason that the Bill has to be worded so broadly other than to give extraordinary powers to government to undermine academic freedom at will. Whereas during the past decade scientists were mainly concerned with opposing secrecy and restrictions imposed by industry and commercial enterprises, they now have to worry again about undue influences by the state. As research becomes more global, national restrictions and added bureaucracy do not make sense and will be unnecessarily prohibitive. While some control over a narrowly defined list of sensitive areas might be understandable in the fight against terrorist attacks, there are no circumstances under which the proposed far-reaching measures are justified. Academic freedom must remain sacrosanct. Otherwise, terrorism has won a terrible victory by destroying one of the fundamental democratic values of the civilised world.