A 50-year history of “zombie firms” in Japan: How banks and shareholders have been involved in corporate bailouts?

Abstract

We review long-term changes in “zombie firms” in Japan over this half-century using listed firm data with a framework in which the concept of “zombie firms” includes possible efficient bailouts. The first wave of zombie firms occurred during the period of main banks (hereinafter MBs). MBs were able to actively choose which firms would receive bailouts at the time. However, commonly held beliefs about MBs’ monitoring power and the special role of corporate groups and long-term credit banks for bailouts are not supported. In the largest wave of the lost decade, we find the zombie firm problem in the manufacturing sector was just as serious as the non-manufacturing in terms of firm count. Moreover, the pathological phenomena such as unwilling concentration of loans to MBs were also rather typical in the manufacturing. Soft budget constraints have continued in the manufacturing even after the resolution of banks’ non-performing loans since the bubble burst came to an end, leading to the manufacturing-centered third wave of zombie firms following the Global Financial Crisis.