Abstract
AbstractThis chapter sets the stage for distinguishing the distinctively psychological kind representation from broader kinds (often also called ‘representation’) shared by psychology with biology. It argues for a use for the (or a) notion representation that is distinctive to psychology. By focusing on actual explanation in science, it roughs out one border of a psychological kind, representation. It argues that certain psychological explanations are not special cases of biological explanations. Psychological explanations have a distinct explanatory paradigm. Psychology depends on there being systematic, functional pre-representational causal relations with the environment. But it discovers its own kinds. One of them is the kind representation. The chapter also develops a specific conception of perception that indicates a significant, explanatorily relevant kind. It concludes with examples of explanation in perceptual psychology that are distinctive of psychology and that invoke the kinds representation and perception.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.