Abstract
AbstractThis chapter sets the stage for distinguishing the distinctively psychological kind representation from broader kinds (often also called ‘representation’) shared by psychology with biology. It argues for a use for the (or a) notion representation that is distinctive to psychology. By focusing on actual explanation in science, it roughs out one border of a psychological kind, representation. It argues that certain psychological explanations are not special cases of biological explanations. Psychological explanations have a distinct explanatory paradigm. Psychology depends on there being systematic, functional pre-representational causal relations with the environment. But it discovers its own kinds. One of them is the kind representation. The chapter also develops a specific conception of perception that indicates a significant, explanatorily relevant kind. It concludes with examples of explanation in perceptual psychology that are distinctive of psychology and that invoke the kinds representation and perception.
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