8. After Auschwitz

Islamic Liberalism Shaul Bakhash (bio) Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies by Leonard Binder. University of Chicago Press, 1988. 399 pp. The recent Islamic revival in the Middle East has often taken the form of cultural assertiveness, hostility to the West, and rejection of Western forms of economic and political organization, including capitalism and democracy. Exponents of the Islamic revival argue for the superiority of the "Islamic" way (variously defined) of organizing polities, economies, and societies. In Islamic Liberalism, Leonard Binder, professor of political science at the University of California at Los Angeles, sets himself an intriguing and significant task: to examine whether liberal democratic regimes may nevertheless emerge in the Middle East in spite of—or even partly as a result of—the Muslim awakening. Binder's underlying assumptions deserve a brief summary. He notes that the Islamic resurgence is taking place in the Middle East at a time when power tends increasingly to be concentrated in the state. Middle Eastern states, moreover, have tended to be dominated by petty—bourgeois interests (for example, bureaucrats and small shopkeepers)—not the most fertile ground for liberal democracy. But Binder also argues that these strong states, if they are not "autonomous" (that is, insulated from pressures from their various constituencies), may advance the interests of the emergent entrepreneurial bourgeoisie. He notes that in Turkey and more dramatically in Egypt, the state-dominated economy is in partial retreat, and that a similar, if less pronounced trend is evident in Syria and Iraq. He argues that some states in the region may already be described as bourgeois states, or at least as "embryonic bourgeois states," [End Page 117] even if the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie in these countries remains politically weak. But the emergence of bourgeois states does not guarantee the emergence of liberal polities. In some forms, bourgeois or capitalist states can also be authoritarian and antidemocratic. Since secularism is in decline and is thus unlikely to serve as a basis for political liberalism, Binder believes political liberalism will not succeed in the Middle East without "a vigorous Islamic liberalism." "At the moment," he writes, "the Islamic resurgence and the rise of capitalism appear about to converge or clash. The question is whether their confluence can lead to the establishment of liberal government, or whether it is more likely to lead to an anticapitalist authoritarianism of the state, to an obscurantist rejection of modernity and capitalism, or to the emergence of a repressive, authoritarian, capitalist state." Binder seeks to answer this question by examining the manner in which Arab and Islamic thinkers, and a number of Western scholars, have treated such issues as the relationship of Islam and politics; the capitalist and Marxist roads to modernization; the possibility of a third, "Islamic" route to economic development; the encounter of Islamic societies with the West; and the thorny problem faced by Muslim societies that wish to accept Westernization without surrendering their unique cultural identity. He examines these issues from a number of perspectives (secularism, Islamic fundamentalism, Marxism, Islamic "authenticity," Islamic liberalism, and Edward Said's critique of "orientalism"), concentrating on one or two major authors for each perspective. For example, Ali Abd al-Raziq, whose 1924 book arguing for a separation of religion and politics caused an uproar in his native Egypt and earned him a rebuke from the chief clerics, is the prism through which Binder examines the secular approach to politics. Similarly, the work of Abdallah Laroui, a leading Moroccan intellectual, serves to illustrate the attempt to conceive of a liberal polity that incorporates and draws on the Islamic tradition. But Binder does more. He ushers us into the debate that such writers and their work have engendered within the Arab world, allowing us to listen in on the dialogue of Middle Eastern thinkers not only with the West, but among themselves. He also enters into a dialogue with these thinkers himself, attempting to expose the philosophical underpinnings of their ideas, seeking out those elements in their thought that might further (and those that might impede) the emergence of a liberal politics. Binder is explicit about his own "prejudices": He is eager to see political liberalism—which he defines as embracing pluralism...

This article is intended to serve as a ‘think piece’ which invites readers to view current perceived changes to the conduct of modern warfare in the broader historical light outlined by proponents of epochal change theory. Neo-medievalists have gone a step in this direction and posited that these changes represent the future of warfare and are evidence of a return, in a sense, to the primary tenets of political and social organization that existed in the period commonly referred to as the Middle Ages. The contention herein is that the answer gains more accuracy if one takes a much longer historical standpoint beginning with classical civilization and moving through the medieval period to our modern world. With regard to the present, this epochal warfare analysis projects that a shift from a Westphalian to post-Westphalian global system is underway. During this period of transition – as in the transition periods between epochs which have preceded it – the dominant state form undergoes a deinstitutionalization process, and war is less about traditional issues of state sovereignty, and instead increasingly over ‘what the new form of social and political organization will be’.

Current research on Chaco Canyon and its surrounding outlier communities is at an important juncture. Rather than trying to argue for the presence or absence of complexity, archaeologists working in the area are asking different questions, especially how Chacoan political, economic, ritual, and social organization were structured. These lines of inquiry do not attempt to pigeonhole Chaco into traditional neoevolutionary types, but instead seek to understand the historical trajectory that led to the construction of monumental architecture in Chaco Canyon and a large part of the northern Southwest in the 10th through 12th centuries. This review discusses the conclusions of current research at Chaco including definitions of the Chaco region, recent fieldwork, histories of Chaco archaeology, chronology, paleoenvironmental reconstruction, demography, political organization, outlier communities, economic organization, social organization, ritual, violence, and the post-Chacoan reorganization. Although many issues are hotly debated, there is a growing concensus that power was not based in a centralized political organization and that ritual organization was a key factor in the replication of Chacoan architecture across a vast regional landscape. Exactly how ritual, social, and political organization intersected is a central question for Chaco scholars. The resolution of this problem will prove to be of interest to all archaeologists working with intermediate societies across the globe.

The Mandailing people originate from north-western part of the province of North Sumatra, Indonesia, today. They are relatively late corners to the Islamic faith, having entered the fold of Islam only during the Padri War (1821-38), some at the point of the sword. The Padri War paved the way to Dutch intervention in the Mandailing homeland and triggered the mass migration of the Mandailing into peninsular West Malaysia. By 1870s, the British had intervened in the peninsular states. On both sides of the Straits of Malacca, the Mandailings negotiated their identity in terms of their political and economic roles vis-a-vis the colonial powers. Possibly influenced by Hambali and Maliki ”madhhab” (school of jurisprudence), the Mandailing practice of Islam gives prominence to ”adapt” (customary law) and 'urf (common practice) as a form of public good, hence the saying ”ombar do adat dohot ugamo” (custom alongside religion). In their enthusiasm to learn about their new found religion, Mandailing participated in the knowledge networks of Minangkabau (province of West Sumatra, Indonesia), Kedah in the Malaysian peninsula, and the Middle-East especially Makkah (Mecca) and Cairo. This eventually brought indigenized 'Mandailing-Islam' closer in line with mainstream Islam, entailing their absorption into the dominant ”madhhab” (school of jurisprudence) in Southeast Asia, that of the Shafie. Growing participation in the Hajj transported the Mandailing from the margin to the 'centre' of the ”ummah” and exposed them to pan-Islamism as well as the idea of national liberation. Central to this movement is the idea of modernity and standardization; the Mandailing response to the demands of modernizing Islam necessitated the abandonment or suppression of traditional Islam. Subjected to both Dutch colonial rule in the Netherlands East Indies and British colonial rule in Malaya, the Mandailings experienced and negotiated within the framework of two different sets of state sponsored Islam. With ”merdeka” (national independence), state sponsored Islam is brought to its logical conclusion by enshrining Islam as the state or official religion in both Malaysian and Indonesian constitutions. Muslim conformity to statistic Islam is regulated through social-engineering, Islamic policing and national consciousness construction. Disenchantment with nationalism and modernist-reformist Islam has resurrected. 'Islamic fundamentalism' as well as revived 'traditionalist Islam'. Mandailing finds themselves on both sides of the spectrum. By contrast, an indigenized Mandailing-Islam still lingers especially in the homeland. This takes on a number of manifestations such as the kinship and clan-based social structure, ”tarombo” (genealogies), reverence for pre-Islamic ancestors and progenitors without differentiation, and the playing of the mystical ”Gordang Sambilan” music. This paper is in four parts, and discusses the practice of 'Mandailing Islam' in their homeland in Sumatra as well as in British Malaya (Peninsula West Malaysia today); Christian missionary activities in the homeland contributing to the consolidation of Mandailing cultural and religious identity in Sumatra and Peninsular Malaya. It also looks at Mandailing religious attitude in the East Coast of Sumatra, where significant numbers of Mandailings are concentrated. The period covered range from pre-Islamic to the present time and deals with the question of Mandailing cultural and Islamic identity.

Caring about humanitarian crises

Notions of equality have long posed a normative problem for liberal theory. What stance should the liberal take toward the failure of the political system to remedy the seemingly inevitable inequitable distribution of socioeconomic wealth and resources? This question squarely highlights one of the ironic paradoxes associated with the confluence of liberalism and constitutionalism, because both are simultaneously necessary and incompatible with each other for at least one germane reason — collective self-government, representative institutions, and individualism can operate to produce unegalitarian relationships between disparately situated groups in a given society, which can in turn substantially harm the project of political (as well as economic) equality.Israel presents a remarkable examination on the relationship between liberal theory and equality. First, Israel is commonly described as the only democracy in the Middle East. Because the common assumption is that Israel’s political system holds natural affinities with Western democratic tradition, it would seem safe to assume that what is meant is Israel’s liberal democracy. Yet the tension between its contradictory values — a “Jewish” state and a “liberal state — has continue to generate intense controversy. This essay proceeds from the contention that Israel embodies an ethnic “democracy,” in which the dominant Jewish majority control State functions with the aim of advancing peculiar demographic, religious, security and cultural norms, often at odds with the rights and freedoms of its Arab minority population.Second, the status of this Arab minority in Israel continues to present one of the most intense and intricate issues in Israeli society. The reality is that 1.2 million Arab citizens of Israel (18.5% of the population) do not enjoy equal access with Jewish citizens to state resources. Geographical inequality in the distribution of services follows ethnic lines, negatively affecting Arab communities which tend to be disadvantaged in relation to the rights and economic security enjoyed by relatively well-off Jewish communities. Governmental policies also continue to offer preferential treatment for residents of some of the Jewish settlements on West Bank territory. Although The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is widely considered a mini-bill of rights by Israeli legal scholars, it does not enumerate a right to equality; on the contrary, it exclusively emphasizes the character of the state as a Jewish state. This can partly be attributed to the lack of “constitutional” (i.e., legal) guarantees for economic and social rights to minorities in Israel. Part I examines Israel’s democratic and legal structure. Ultimately, the discussion concludes that the idea of a Jewish state is squarely incompatible with protection of minority rights — a central tenet of constitutionalism. This discussion thus suggests why Israel cannot claim to comply with democratic liberal norms while simultaneously privileging one ethic group over another. The pairing “Jewish” and “democratic” both codifies discrimination against non-Jewish citizens and impedes realization of full guarantees for political and socioeconomic equality.The political implications of this argument are substantial. First, as mentioned, it critically calls into question the democratic nature of the State of Israel. Second, it strongly questions popular Western conception that views Palestinians and Israelis as equal, symmetrically balanced parties. To this end, Part II analyzes three important Israeli High Court decisions that grapple with complex issues relating to discrimination and (in)equality. In short, the so-called Israeli “constitutional” structure has largely remained unresponsive to its Arab minority. Because the peculiar “liberal” form of Israeli governance long praised by liberal scholars has not resolved the troubling divergence between a rights-based jurisprudence and continued economic and institutional discrimination against Arab-Israelis,entrenching civil liberties and socioeconomic equality in Israel requires not only formal legal codification but also the creation of the conditions for political willingness.

The study of Syrian politics allows us to engage in multiple debates current in contemporary political science. Syria exemplifies the problematic of nation-building as few states have been afflicted with such a radical disjuncture between territory and identity. As the Syrian state started out as notoriously unstable, its history allows us to understand the techniques and conditions in which stable authoritarian states have been constructed in the third world and Middle East. Syria fits well with the literature on authoritarian persistence and the failure of democratization in the Middle East. In this respect, Syria provides material relevant to topics such as neo-patrimonialism, the role of the military in politics and also single party systems. Syria also provides material for studies of political economy, including such debates as the failure of populist roads to development, agrarian reform, of the role and character of state-bourgeoisies and the difficulties of transition from statistcentred to market economies. Finally, at the level of foreign policies, Syria’s role is quite distinctive, considered by some to be a rogue state and by others exemplifying rare defiance of US hegemony and resistance to globalization.

Women and Islamism in Israel Suheir Abu Oksa Daoud (bio) This article explores the rise of Islamism in Israel, reviews its effect on women’s status and their public roles, and examines the different ways women participate in the movement.1 It also examines the interrelationship of nationalism, feminism, and Islamism in Palestinian women’s experiences in the public sphere as part of an ethnic minority in a Jewish state. I argue that facing state challenges, as well as Palestinian secular parties, the Islamic Movement in Israel (Al-Haraka al-Islamiyya, subsequently referred to as the im) has adopted a contradictory policy toward gender issues; it invokes modernism and yet it emphasizes religiosity/traditionalism. A second argument is that while “fundamentalism” and patriarchy support each other and the combination has a negative impact on women’s activism, my research shows that women in the im were mobilized and the public-private dichotomy was cracked open; women were mobilized in the public arena but they remained largely invisible from positions of power in the movement. I examine multiple subjects including im women in politics, the feminist-nationalist debate, polygamy and fertility, and the hijab to show how traditional/religious values of the im survive and yet have been shaken by the wave of modernization that has been influencing the movement. The result: contradictions in the movement’s practices and discourses. While the 1980s saw an increase in the study of the Palestinian minority in Israel, research on the women of this minority continued to be highly marginalized. There has been a scarcity of research on women’s activism in the im and their voices have been silent. This essay is aimed at taking the first steps to examine this important topic. The article is based on my previous research, available literature, im publications, and in-depth interviews conducted between 2013 and 2015 with im female activists, Palestinian Muslim and non-Muslim activists, policy makers, [End Page 21] and religious leaders in Israel, to examine the different forms of their social involvement and activism.2 An examination of the role of Palestinian women in the im in Israel has to be framed within the larger national political context of being a part of an ethnic, national, and religious minority in a Jewish state, and the different factors—stemming from four circles: Muslim, Arab, Palestinian, and Israeli—that form the identity of the im.3 Historically, Palestinian women were activists long before the Nakba (the Palestinian catastrophe), but their connection to that legacy was shockingly severed after the 1948 war. In Israel the dramatic historical-national-political circumstances delayed Palestinian women’s activism and the rebirth of women and feminist organizations in Israel.4 Further, Israel’s new government viewed the remaining Palestinian minority as a security risk and imposed military rule (1948–66). Palestinian citizens endured military restrictions and regulations and were prohibited from forming political organizations outside the Zionist parties. The Muslim Brothers (mb) who operated in Palestine prior to 1948 suffered a major setback; all their institutions in the newly formed Jewish state were shut down. The movement was suppressed and was unable to recover.5 Moreover, the Arab leadership fled, Palestinians in Israel were left without religious guidance or religious courts, and access to Islam was hindered.6 By Israeli law the Communist Party of Israel (later the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, dfpe) was the only non-Zionist party that was allowed to function in Israel.7 An Islamic revival in Israel took place following the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip after the 1967 war. With renewed contact between Palestinians in Israel and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, the Islamic Movement began penetrating the Triangle area in Israel.8 Several Israeli scholars argue that while Islamism in Israel is part of the general awakening of the 1970s Islamic revival in the Middle East, it has special characteristics. It is rooted in the particular experience of the Islamic Movement as part of an Arab minority in a Jewish state with clear Jewish political and cultural hegemony.9 Raphael Israeli suggests that Islamization was a way to escape the marginalization and hostility of...

The dangers arising from Islamic fundamentalism in the Gaza Strip and West Bank are obvious: bombings and commitments to continue the armed struggle against Israeli occupation despite the signing of the Oslo agreements. The problem was true before the new Intifada of 2000 and it has heightened impact now. I will not address this except to say that the new conflict, at least in part, comes out of a social services structure that has crumbled over the past decade. The fundamental problem is that during the course of the Peace Process more people have become disenfranchised. This has led to more violence and radicalism, not less. The historic structure of ‘fundamentalist terrorism’2 has led to the idea that Islam and the West are somehow irreconcilably opposed to each other, resulting in what is referred to as the clash of civilizations, which assumes the Middle East and the West are two homogeneous entities lacking permeability, diversity, or nuance. No viewpoint could be more misleading.

In almost every country in the world there are Muslim communities, numbering over one billion. Much of the Muslims are concentrated in the Middle and Middle East, where there are various political and civic organizations that take an active part in the life of the Islamic world and influence the development of modern society. Among them are organizations that provide regional stability and coordinate interstate relations. These are the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and several others. International non-governmental organizations, such as the League of the Islamic World, the People's Islamic Congress, and numerous non-governmental religious and political organizations, are constantly active. There are many charitable, educational, cultural or political organizations within the laws of their countries.

This article focuses on the tension between the Islamic Middle East and the international community. After a brief study from the political, economic and cultural perspectives and a review of relevant documents and materials, the author has decided on the current research perspective. The sub-state actors in the Middle East mainly refer to religious and political organizations which can infiltrate into or influence this area or the international community, terrorist organizations of religious extremists, straddling groups and minority groups which seek independence or unification. Their major influence on the international community lies in their resistance against the present state weakens the nation state system in the Middle East and pushes anti-state/system movements; their significant role imposes a deep impact on the peace process in the Middle East; they lead to external intervention from the international system and growing tension between the Middle East and the international community. The root of the above-mentioned tension is that the combined actions of internal and external factors have made the Middle East system vulnerable and infiltrable, creating the soil for the rise of religious and political organizations and thus inspiring the anti-system movements of the sub-state actors in the Middle East.

<i>Israel's Moment: International Support for and Opposition to Establishing the Jewish State, 1945–1949</i> by Jeffrey Herf

The Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson initiated the Taskforce for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research in 1998 after visiting a Nazi concentration camp and...

Since 2012 one can speak about a real civil war in Syria with participation of different political forces. Extremist Islamist jihadist groups like “Front al-Nusra” and “Islamic State of Iraq and Levant” (ISIL) play very active role among them. Relations between ruling elites and Islamists have been very complex in Syria during the past decades. On the one hand, Syrian Alawite regime is secular and nationalist. On the other hand, official Damascus used to be one of the sponsors of the militant Islamist anti-Israeli and anti-Western groups in the Middle East. Besides, Syria is a close ally of Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanese Shi'ite Hizbullah. From our point of view, the union between Assad's Syria and Islamist groups was rather tactical than strategic one. Syria always played very important role for Sunni Islam, e.g., “the Land of Sham” had a big importance in eschatological beliefs of Sunni Muslims as a place of the final battle between Believers and Dajjal (Anti-Christ). Many foreign Islamist militant involved in Syrian War are inspired by this belief. Additionally, although a big majority of Syrians are Sunni, a dominance of Alawite sect in the political and social and economic life of the country disaffects of many Syrians with an escalation of Syrian conflict. Islamization of “Syrian revolution” is connected with cruel oppression of opposition by Assad's forces and powerless position of the West. At the same time, islamisation is a common feature of the Arab Spring. Arab Spring extremist Islamists have appeared along with relatively moderate Islamist and secular pro-Western groups. Foreign militant Jihadists play an important role in radicalisation of Islamist factor in the conflict. While Shi'ite groups (like pro-Iranian Hizbullah) regards Syria as a crucial part of Shi'ite belt from Mediterranean to Iran, Sunni extremists are not going to lose ground in the face of Shiite 'heretics'. The involvement of Arab Wahhabi monarchies (Saudi Arabia and Qatar) in the current turbulence must be also noted. ISIL is now the key actor of Syrian civil war. It is active not only in Syria but also in Iraq, the homeland of the organization. Initially, this Sunni militant group was closely connected to Al Qaeda. Now the relationships between them are rather tense because of ISIL’s efforts to overmaster another Jihadist group, “Front al Nusra”. The strategic aim of the ISIL is an establishment of an Islamic State (in Iraq and later in Syria) and the restoration of Caliphate. The tactics of the ISIL include guerrilla warfare and cruel terrorist attacks against military and civil people. In Syria ISIL fights against Assad's forces as armed opposition (both secular and Islamist) for control over territories and power. “Front al Nusra” (Front of Support of the Land of Sham People, FN) is genetically connected to ISIL. In terms of ideology there are no divergences between two groups, but they are rivals when it concerns the issues of popular support and political influence. Some Syrian people consider FN as a local group in contrast to foreign militants dominated ISIL. Activities of Jihadist groups is a real danger not only for Syria, but for the whole region and even worldwide.

“When I was coming up, it was a dangerous world, and you knew exactly what they were. It was us versus them, and it was clear who them was” (vi). Presidential candidate George W. Bush’s addled Cold War nostalgia serves as the inspiration for Douglas Little’s study of the post–Cold War confrontation between the U.S. and radical Islam. Little picks up on a theme—Americans’ perennial need for a “them”—raised in the third edition of his previous book, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (2008). In Us versus Them: The United States, Radical Islam, and the Rise of the Green Threat, he contributes extensive new research and analysis on the foreign policies of the four most recent U.S. presidents to explain how the “Green Threat” of radical Islam replaced the “Red Threat” of Soviet communism as America’s “other” and larger-than-life enemy. In an engagingly written, compact book consisting of an introduction and six chapters, Little places the war against radical Islam into long-term patterns of U.S. history. Recent Islamophobia, he notes, “echoed xenophobic tales from the distant and not-so-distant past exaggerating the malevolent intentions and diabolical powers of Native Americans, African slaves, Nazi spies, and Bolshevik revolutionaries eager to do ‘us’ harm” (13). Citing examples extending back to the Puritan war against the Wampanoags, Little convincingly argues that “the notion of a virtuous America endangered by wicked and violent enemies was not new at all” (15). The Cold War set the terms for America’s confrontation with radical Islam. Not only did the U.S. support Islamist states, including Saudi Arabia and groups such as the Afghan mujahidin as anti-communist allies, but the Cold War would also provide useful precedents for architects of the war on terror. A prime example is NSC-68, the 1950 charter for globalizing the Cold War under Harry Truman, which neoconservatives in the George W. Bush administration invoked as a model for mobilizing American society against a putatively existential threat.