Abstract

The 3rd generation partnership project (3GPP) has been enhancing the security of the 5G AKA (authentication and key agreement) protocol. However, there may still be some shortcomings in the latest version of the 5G AKA protocol. According to the analysis of the latest version of the 5G AKA protocol, this paper points out seven of its shortcomings. To overcome these shortcomings, an improved primary authentication and key agreement protocol for 5G networks is proposed, which is named 5G-IPAKA. Compared with the latest version of the 5G AKA protocol, the main improvements include that the pre-shared key between the user equipment (UE) and the home network (HN) is replaced with a derivation key as the pre-shared key, the challenge-–response mechanism for the serving network (SN) is added, the mutual authentication and key confirmation occurs between the UE and the SN, and the message authentication code (MAC) failure procedure is replaced with a timeout mechanism on the HN. Then, the 5G-IPAKA protocol is proven secure in the mixed strand space model for mixed protocols. Further discussion and comparative analysis show that the 5G-IPAKA protocol can overcome the above shortcomings of the latest version of the 5G AKA protocol, and is better than the recently improved 5G AKA protocols. Additionally, the 5G-IPAKA protocol is efficient and backward-compatible.

Highlights

  • Received: 13 February 2022With the continuous popularization of 5G communication technology, in the near future, the 5G network, as an important communication infrastructure, will penetrate into diverse vertical fields, such as in transportation, medical treatment, and industry, and will support various information interactions between people, people and things, and things and things [1]

  • The 5G-IPAKA protocol is secure in the mixed strand space model; Through discussion and analysis, we are able to overcome the above shortcomings of the latest version of the 5G AKA protocol; mation 2022, 13, x FOR PEER REVIEW

  • In this paper, according to the analysis of the latest version of the 5G AKA protocol, we point out seven shortcomings of this protocol, including that subscription concealed identifier (SUCI) can be replayed without being found, mutual authentication between the user equipment (UE) and the serving network (SN) cannot be established, KSEAF cannot reach an agreement, the location privacy of the UE can be compromised, denial of service (DoS)

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Summary

Introduction

With the continuous popularization of 5G communication technology, in the near future, the 5G network, as an important communication infrastructure, will penetrate into diverse vertical fields, such as in transportation, medical treatment, and industry, and will support various information interactions between people, people and things, and things and things [1]. In [23], the authors discovered an attack exploiting subscription concealed identifier (SUCI) to track a subscriber in the 5G network, which is directly caused by the insecure air channel To cover this issue, they proposed a secure authentication scheme by utilizing the existing public key infrastructure (PKI) mechanism. They proposed a secure authentication scheme by utilizing the existing public key infrastructure (PKI) mechanism They found a location sniffing attack, which can be implemented by an attacker through inexpensive devices [24]. The 5G-IPAKA protocol is secure in the mixed strand space model; Through discussion and analysis, we are able to overcome the above shortcomings of the latest version of the 5G AKA protocol; mation 2022, 13, x FOR PEER REVIEW.

Result, KSEAF, SUPI
Shortcomings of the 5G AKA Protocol
Result
Formal Verification of the 5G-IPAKA Protocol
Security of the 5G-IPAKA Protocol
Performance of the 5G-IPAKA Protocol
Conclusions
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