Abstract
This chapter presents an overview on the transition to practical freedom in the critique of practical reason. It deals with the change of mental orientation during the transition of the representation of practical freedom in the critique of pure reason to the critique of practical reason. The chapter shows that the Kant develops ideas in the starting point of the reason and the fact of the moral law autonomy. It emphasizes in particular that Kant in the critique of practical reason represents a viewpoint on the moral law as the basic law of the intelligible world. The chapter reveals the discussions related to the ideal of the highest good, especially with regard to the will structure of the original good and shows that the will structure contributes to the maximum development of practical freedom. The original text of the chapter is in German.Keywords: intelligible world; moral law autonomy; practical freedom; practical reason; will structure
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