4. VISIBILITY AND VICTIMIZATION: Hate Crime Laws and the Geography of Punishment, 1980s and 1990s

Teaching and Learning Guide for: Isn’t Every Crime a Hate Crime? The Case for Hate Crime Laws

This paper aims to examine the significance of xenophobia and hate crimes in multicultural societies. It begins with outlining the general discussions about multiculturalism, xenophobia and hate crimes. It identifies hate crimes that related to xenophobia in multicultural society and introduces hate crime laws in Australia. While Australian multicultural policy has its roots in government responses to the post settlement issues facing migrants, through the 1980s and 1990s policy was articulated more broadly as an element of Australia's nation building narratives. Today all Australian States and Territories have active policies and programs dealing with multiculturalism. As other multicultural societies, Australia confronts with challenges in building a multicultural society. One of them is xenophobia and hate crimes related to race, ethnic, religions. A number of common law countries have introduced legislation designed to respond to the problem of prejudice-related crime, commonly referred to as hate crime law. Whilst the heavier penalties imposed by hate crime laws are designed to denounce, and thereby deter, prejudice-related violence, it is apparent that these laws are meant to do more than punish and deter. They aim to condemn, not just criminal conduct per se, but also racism, homophobia, religious intolerance and the like. In this way Australia seek to make a broad moral claim that prejudice is wrong and to thereby reinforce pro-social values of tolerance and respect for marginalized and disadvantaged groups. This paper argues that hate crime laws are necessary in order to prevent hate crimes related to multiculturalism and suggests that Australian hate crime laws can be implied to sustain multiculturalism in Korea.

Hate crime laws are a highly controversial legal approach in society's response to intergroup violence. Argument acceptance, knowledge, and individual differences were examined in relationship to attitudes about these laws. These variables were also considered in terms of efforts to influence a peer's beliefs about hate crime laws. One‐hundred and sixty‐seven participants completed a measure of knowledge of human rights laws, Gough's Pr scale, the Selznick and Steinberg anti‐Semitism scale, and Cuellar's Machismo scale. Hate crime attitudes were measured on an affect rating scale and six statements reflecting arguments favoring and opposing hate crime laws. Peer influence was examined on Interpersonal Power Inventory (IPI). Results showed that while most participants endorsed positive attitudes about hate crime laws, men—and both women and men who endorsed machismo attitudes—were more likely to agree with media distortion and identity politics arguments opposing hate crime laws. The Pr and machismo scales predicted greater effort on the IPI to influence peer attitudes about hate crime laws, after controlling for demographic differences of the participants. These findings indicate that more explicitly biased individuals were more effortful in trying to change the attitudes of peers concerning the legitimacy of hate crime laws.

Supporters of hate crime legislation suggest that the primary reason for the codification of hate crime laws is “to send a strong message of tolerance and equality, signaling to all members of society that hatred and prejudice on the basis of identity will be punished with extra severity.” However, hate crime laws may actually be accomplishing the opposite effect of tolerance and equality because they encourage U.S. citizens to view themselves, not as members of our society, but as members of a protected group. The enactment of hate crime legislation at the federal and state levels has led to unintended consequences and unfair practices. Today, the controversy regarding the effectiveness of hate crime laws is debated, and people question whether this type of legislation is beneficial to society. This article will candidly reevaluate hate crime legislation. Part II will provide the definition of the term “hate crime” and the theoretical justification for enhanced sentencing involving discrimination-based conduct. Focus will be placed on data that disproves the theory that hate crime laws reduce or deter future hate crimes. It will also explain the underlying reasons for the enactment of hate crime laws, such as the media’s role and political influences, and it will present several of the misconceptions associated with hate crime legislation. Part III will present the unintended consequences associated with the enactment of hate crime statutes, including constitutional violations. It will also explain why hate crimes are rarely prosecuted, and will focus on the inconsistency, redundancy, and arbitrary usage/application of hate crime legislation. Part III will also present an individual’s response to the negative, unintended effects of hate crime legislation. Part IV will determine that hate crime legislation is not cost-effective. Part V sets forth a recommendation on improving community efforts to educate or reeducate citizens on respecting diversity. Finally, the article analyzes hate crime laws from supporting and opposing viewpoints and concludes that there is no need to separate hate crimes from other types of crimes as a means to promote a more tolerant, equal, and stable society.

This study investigated how racial prejudice influences White college students' perceptions of hate crime. We also examined the moderating effects of the race of the victim of hate crimes and the absence of hate crime laws. Our sample included 581 White students in a predominantly White university located in a state that does not have a hate crime law. The study was set up in a 2 (race of the victim and the perpetrator) × 3 (level of assault) factorial design. Participants rated their perceptions of three scenarios (i.e., non-racially biased simple assault, racially biased simple assault, and racially biased aggravated assault). The dependent variables were perceptions of hate crime and willingness to report. The key independent variable was participants' level of racial prejudice. The moderators included race of the victim in each scenario and whether participants' state of origin has a hate crime law. Results suggest that higher levels of modern racism were associated with lower perceptions of hate crime and lower willingness to report racially biased simple and aggravated hate crime. When the victim was White, participants with higher levels of racial prejudice were more likely to perceive a hate crime and more willing to report it. The opposite was true when the victim was Black. The absence of state hate crime laws and race of victim were significant moderators. Our study suggests that racial prejudice is associated with lower perceptions of hate crime and willingness to report. Furthermore, the moderating effect of the race of victims provides insights on how racial prejudice can lead to a differential perception of hate crime, depending on whether one's racial in-group is targeted. Our findings also highlight the importance of having state-level hate crime laws to mitigate the linkage between modern racism and perceptions of hate crime.

This work addresses a central question in both social problems theory and sociolegal studies: how can we understand and account for the content of legal categories that define social problems and attendant victims? It offers an empirical analysis of the emergence and evolution of federal hate crime laws—the Hate Crimes Statistics Act, the Violence Against Women Act, and the Rate Crimes Penalty Enhancement Act—that determine who is and is not eligible for hate crime victim status. By examining the legislative histories of these laws as evidence of “critical discursive moments” (Gamson 1992), I show how the substantive character of the law was shaped over time: 1 first establish a historical context for federal hate crime law: then I analyze how an important element hate crime law—the adoption of select status provisions, such as race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender, and disabilities—unfolded such that some victims of discriminatory violence have been recognized as hate crime victims while others have gone unnoticed. In particular, people of color, Jews, gays and lesbians, women, and those with disabilities increasingly have been recognized as victims of hate crime, while union members, the elderly, children, and police officers, for example, have not. The findings suggest that the content of federal hate crime law was shaped by a series of temporally bound institutionally qualified processes whereby: 1) the empirical credibility of the scope of hate crime as a social problem was established by the claimsmaking of established social movement organizations; 2) a trio of core provisions for hate crime law—race, religion, and ethnicity—was cemented as the anchoring provisions of all hate crime law through discursive strategies that rendered particular types of violence empirically credible and worthy of federal attention; 3) the domain of the law expanded to include additional provisions, most notably sexual orientation and gender, in qualitatively distinct ways; and 4) the increased differentiation of legal subjects in subsequent law occurred in ways consistent with previously established and institutionalized policy pedigrees. Taken together, these findings reveal how microlevel processes of categorization work, mesolevel processes of social movement mobilization, and larger processes of institutionalization interface as political actors create and coalesce around legal meanings that define both “condition-categories” and “people-categories” (Loseke 1993).

Hate crime policy has developed from the early legislation of the 1968 Civil Rights Act to the 2009 Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crime Prevention Act, to be increasingly inclusive in terms of identity and comprehensive in terms of ramifications. Hence a body of scholarship around the trajectory and implications of hate crime laws has developed, as has a robust discourse on the definitions of hate crime itself and theories on who perpetrates bias-motivated violence and why it occurs. Between definitions of hate crime, a tension exists between legal definitions and those of theorists who are attempting incorporate understanding of context into the definition. Similarly, the theories on who perpetrates hate crimes and why they occur exhibit tensions between strain-based theories. While some scholars have deployed Merton’s (1938) strain theory associated with societal anomie, others point to changing norms. As hate crime laws have become more inclusive of sexual orientation and gender identity/expression, avenues of research into the disparities in experience of bias-motivated crimes between enumerated categories has increased. Persistent in the research on hate crime is the deficiency of data on victimization and ramifications beyond direct victims. While data on the scope of the policies is clear, inconsistencies in data collection around victimization render available resources insufficient. Most recently, research on hate crime policy has intersected with queer theory to question whether hate crime laws are positive for the LGBTQ community or society at large. Organizations such as the Silvia Rivera Law Project, for example, have pushed back on calls for inclusive hate crime laws via challenging the propensity to provide additional resources to the prison-industrial complex. Furthermore, queer scholars of history find a disconnect between the origins of the LGBTI movement in resisting police powers to be antithetical to promoting increased police powers in the form of hate crime legislation.

Hate crimes are crimes that are motivated by personal prejudice or bias. Hate-crime laws criminalise such conduct and allow for the imposition of aggravated penalties on convicted perpetrators. This article examines the historical, social and political factors which influenced the shaping and enactment of the first British hate-crime law. The South African context is also considered since the Department of Justice has recently released the Prevention and Combatting of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill for public commentary and input. While Britain has had a long historical record of criminal conduct that was motivated by the race and the ethnicity of victims, it was only in the twentieth century that civil society first drew attention to the problem of violent racist crimes. Nevertheless, successive British governments denied the problem of racist crimes and refused to consider the enactment of a hate-crime law. Following a high-profile racist murder and a governmental inquiry, a British Labour Party-led government eventually honoured its pre-election commitment and passed a hate-crime law in 1998. Some parallels are apparent between the British and the South African contexts. South Africa also has a long historical record of racially motivated hate crimes. Moreover, in the post-apartheid era there have been numerous reports of racist hate crimes and hate crimes against Black lesbian women and Black foreigners. Despite several appeals from the academic and non-governmental sectors for the enactment of a hate-crime law, and the circulation for public commentary of the Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill, such a law has hitherto not been enacted in South Africa. This article posits that the enactment of a hate-crime law is a constitutional imperative in South Africa in terms of the right to equality and the right to freedom and security of the person. While the enactment of a hate-crime law in South Africa is recommended, it is conceded that enacting a hate-crime law will not eradicate criminal conduct motivated by prejudice and bias.

This chapter considers overlapping legal and policy issues related to hate crimes, summarizing the problem with an emphasis on societal responses. The theoretical insight that law can be understood as an expression of societal values is combined with an emphasis on the empirical study of law in action. The approach taken is theoretical and conceptual in nature, but is also informed by relevant case law and various empirical studies and is concerned to suggest how hate crime research can address issues of both theoretical and policy significance by analyzing how hate crime law is practiced. Some of the findings are that hate crime law can be seen to express values in a wide variety of settings and to express values intentionally, neither of which has been properly acknowledged to date. It is important for public policy analysis and practice as well as for theory development to acknowledge the limitations of both rational choice/deterrence approaches and moral education theories in the hate crime policy domain. Instead of understanding criminal law as a type of threat or type of instruction, in the case of hate crimes the law may be practiced and evaluated most realistically without assuming that hate criminals will be attentive to potential legal sanctions or amenable to moral education. The discussion includes elements of literature review, policy debate, theoretical analysis, and methodological reflection suggesting how hate crime law can be analyzed as expressive law in action, providing material relevant for students, theorists, policy-makers and analysts, and researchers.

This article discusses how maximising freedom of expression increases both liberty and equality. The article focuses on the rationale that is used by many western societies to enact laws to prevent what is termed a ‘hate crime’. A hate crime is usually defined as an offence that is motivated by an offender's beliefs about an immutable characteristic of the victim, such as race, sex, religion, or national origin. The proponents of hate crime laws often believe that restraints on expression, such as racist speech, are justified as a means by which to reduce bigotry and its by product ‐ discrimination. However, in this article, the author concludes that hate crime laws actually diminish liberty and equality and adversely affect a vastly disproportionate number of minority group members. Indeed, actually, hate crime laws may promote a perception of inequality, because they permit more severe punishments for offenders solely on the basis of the race, sex, religion, or national origin of offenders’ victims.

Hate crimes are those in which the victim is selected because of his or her actual or perceived race, color, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or national origin. Hate crime laws have frequently been met with objections. Whereas some objections are based in constitutional law, other objections invoke a variety of psychological constructs, including attitude, motivation, behavior, emotion, and intergroup relations. These objections can be illuminated by relevant psychological theory and research. Topics addressed include the measurement of motivation and intent, and distinctions among attitudes, emotions, and behavior. Hate crimes and other crimes are compared in terms of perpetrators, type and degree of violence, psychological and physical trauma suffered by victims, and community impact. Psychologically based defense strategies used by perpetrators of hate crimes are critiqued. Hate crime laws are also discussed in terms of the political and social values they reflect. Finally, research and policy implications are outlined, including implications for prevention and intervention at the individual, community, and law enforcement levels.

This article responds to scholarly critiques, which highlight the failures of hate crime legislation in delivering justice to historically oppressed groups. Drawing on ethnographic data on the mobilisation of India's only hate crime law – the Prevention of Atrocities (PoA) Act– among Dalit (untouchable) communities, the article proposes that the potential of hate crime law to create a restitution must be analysed in conversation with other social justice frameworks. In India, Dalit legal aid advocates interweave hate crime cases with a culturally specific discourse of Dalit human rights. By strategically bringing “failed” PoA investigations before India's National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), Dalit advocates hold the police accountable for negligent investigations, while also creating collective affects of hope for survivors of casteist crimes. This process, which I call symbiotic justice, engenders a form of legal consciousness, which regards hate crime law as a creative tool that can offer new avenues of agency.

State‐level hate crime laws are a proposed solution for pernicious effects endured by transgender and gender diverse (e.g., no‐binary, queer) (TGD) communities. The present study investigated the following correlates of psychological distress, suicidal behavior, and discrimination experiences among TGD adults: State‐level hate crime law statutes (e.g., gender identity protection), state‐level attitudes (e.g., conservative ideology), and individual‐level marginalized identities (e.g., sexual minority status). Participants were all TGD adults in the 2015 United States Transgender Survey (USTS). We merged three data sources: the USTS, Cooperative Congressional Election Study, and the Anti‐Defamation League's Hate Crime Map. We employed bivariate and logistic regression analyses. Prominent findings spanning the whole sample included: (a) worse psychological distress was associated with living in a state with greater anti‐TGD attitudes and an absence of gender identity protections; (b) worse 12‐month suicidal behavior was associated with living in a state with an absence of gender identity and police data collection statutes; and (c) holding multiple marginalized identities, particularly having a disability, was the strongest risk factor for experiencing negative outcomes. Findings are contextualized by debates about hate crime laws. We offer recommendations for mental health promotion and suicide prevention, hate crimes training, and future research.

The question of judicial protection of trans people has come to the fore in recent years, culminating in Bill C-16 which added gender identity and gender expression to the federal anti-discrimination and hate crime laws. In this article, the author contests the notion that anti-discrimination and hate crime laws are effective in mitigating anti-trans harassment, discrimination, and violence. Suggesting that the model of anti-trans acts which underlies anti-discrimination and hate crime laws is erroneous, the author argues that the law’s impact on trans well-being will be modest and that a careful analysis of anti-trans attitudes enables us to identify a number of more effective governmental avenues toward trans emancipation.

Jesse Larner sounds a shrill alarm in his broadside against hate crime laws ("Hate Crime/Thought Crime," Spring 2010), raising a variety of seemingly dire libertarian, First Amendment, and slippery-slope arguments. Yet, despite the fact that federal and state hate crime laws have been on the books for forty years, he fails to illustrate his parade of horribles with a single actual case to demonstrate the kind of "policing of mind and tongue" about which he frets. Larner recognizes that hate crimes are a "real problem" and asks many of the right questions about the purpose and application of these laws. But Larner's questions have been thoroughly examined—and answered—by police officials and prosecutors who have enforced them and by dozens of court decisions interpreting these laws. Larner is wrong about the impact of hate violence, the policy purposes of hate crime laws, and their constitutionality.