Abstract
For cooperative (NTU) games generated by finite exchange economies with asymmetric information about comrnon payoff-relevant states of the world, private information use is equivalent to the publicly predictable information sharing rule. ~ This leads to balanced games which therefore have nonempty cores as well as Nash verifiability of a coalition member's ex ante cdntingent net trades. Conditions yielding Nash and strong verifiability for more general information sharing rules are also provided. In this way, a class of market games with partial commitment that are classified between cooperative and noncooperative games can be studied.
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