(2021) Volume 2, Issue 4 Cultural Implications of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC Authors: Dr. Unsa Jamshed Amar Jahangir Anbrin Khawaja Abstract: This study is an attempt to highlight the cultural implication of CPEC on Pak-China relations, how it will align two nations culturally, and what steps were taken by the governments of two states to bring the people closer.

The restoration of the ancient Silk Road intends to reconnect China with Africa, the Middle East, and Europe through a railway network, airports, roads, seaports, and an optical fiber system. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has three components. One Belt, One Road (OBOR) is based upon two parts of the BRI; the maritime Silk Road and the Silk Road economic belt. OBOR is based upon six economic corridors. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the smartest corridor under OBOR, which passes only through Pakistan, and after completion, will provide a safe and cheap route for China to import oil and energy. CPEC is a multidimensional project under which much infrastructure development initiative has been started to improve the infrastructure and economic development of Pakistan. Infrastructure development is an essential requirement in economic growth, one which further leads to industrialization and is helpful in economic development. The present study was conducted in Pakistan and explored how infrastructure development under the CPEC is useful for the sustainable development of Pakistan, as well as which kind of infrastructure development projects have been included in the CPEC to improve the socio-economic paradigm of Pakistan. A sample of 500 respondents was selected through a multistage sampling technique from the two-node cities. A questionnaire survey was used to collect primary data. The results of the study show that the CPEC is a catalyst for Pakistan to improve its socio-economic conditions and to achieve sustainable development. The participants of the survey agreed that CPEC will improve the socio-economic paradigm of Pakistan and will be helpful in the achievement of sustainable development goals.

The U.S. Response to the Belt and Road Initiative:Answering New Threats with New Partnerships Arzan Tarapore (bio) The United States has embraced a policy of "strategic competition" with China.1 This competition is most acute in East Asia, where Chinese policies directly challenge the United States' long-standing strategic primacy. China has primed its rapid military modernization to disrupt and deter U.S. forces and has used coercive force to assert territorial revisionism in the South China Sea. But the competition spans multiple regions and dimensions. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) seeks to build Chinese influence across the entire Eurasian landmass and adjacent waters, often at a cost to U.S. interests. Washington has denounced BRI as a "predatory" program that builds influence through corrupt and secretive "debt trap" deals.2 But alongside its economic edifice, BRI is also freighted with strategic implications. The new trade and infrastructure deals will increase Chinese leverage to shape partner nations' preferences, edge out U.S. influence, and expand Chinese military presence.3 South Asia illustrates these political-military dimensions of BRI. China is cultivating an increasingly dependent ally in Pakistan and building a sprawling military presence across the Indian Ocean region, while India and its partners scramble to mount a counterbalance. This essay outlines the implications of these dynamics for U.S. policy. It shows, first, how BRI in South Asia threatens U.S. strategic interests and how the United States is responding through new partnerships with India and other countries. The essay concludes by discussing some recommended principles for the future of U.S. policy in the Indo-Pacific. [End Page 34] How BRI Threatens U.S. Strategic Interests On the surface, BRI offers tangible and immediate economic benefits for regions like South Asia. The region's developing states have a desperate demand for the speedily constructed transportation, energy, and telecommunications infrastructure that BRI promises. The terms and modalities of BRI projects have generated skepticism and opposition, which may prompt China to adjust its approach in its decades-long BRI campaign. More fundamentally, the concept of BRI—and its South Asian centerpiece, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—presents a broad threat to U.S. interests in at least three ways. First and most directly, BRI shields governments that harbor anti-U.S. interests and entrenches their inimical policies. The clearest example of this is Pakistan. The United States and Pakistan have long endured a relationship that oscillates between amity and estrangement. After years of mounting frustration over Pakistan's support for terrorist networks, Washington ultimately cut most aid in 2018.4 CPEC, however, was there to cushion the blow. With a source of lavish financial patronage, Pakistan is now free to persist with its strategy of using militant proxy groups for influence in Afghanistan and attacks against India. Not only is China more tolerant of Pakistan's destabilizing policies; it actively shields Pakistan from external pressure—most prominently, by repeatedly blocking UN action against terrorists such as Masood Azhar, the leader of Jaish-e-Muhammad, who claims sanctuary in Pakistan.5 China's patronage of Pakistan, with CPEC at its center, has also contributed to sharpening strategic alignments in the region. Pakistan is now financially beholden to China and firmly within its orbit. Even if the United States were to resume military aid to Pakistan, which is unlikely in the short term, the entrenched presence of CPEC means that Washington would struggle to recover even the minor influence it previously held. The United States, which has simultaneously made clear its support for India, can no longer serve as a credible intermediary in the perennial security crises between India and Pakistan. In February 2019, as India considered its response to the terrorist attack in Pulwama, U.S. national security adviser John Bolton deviated from decades of U.S. practice and encouraged [End Page 35] the Indian military's retaliation at Balakot.6 With greatly diminished external brakes on escalation, India and Pakistan were able to introduce unprecedented levels of risk to the crisis.7 Through BRI, China has and will continue to also shape the political trajectories of other states in the region. The examples of Mahinda Rajapaksa...

Protecting the Belt and Road Initiative:China's Cooperation with Pakistan to Secure CPEC Filippo Boni (bio) As China's interests and investments expand globally under the new economic and political architecture envisaged with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), so do the risks. China's global ambitions have progressively exposed Chinese assets and nationals abroad to an increasing set of challenges, ranging from threats emanating from terrorist groups and separatist movements to cautious and critical views about Chinese investments and personnel working in foreign countries. Among the more than one hundred countries that have now signed up to BRI, Pakistan, through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), epitomizes most of the challenges that Beijing is confronting in the implementation of its BRI-driven international design.1 CPEC—designated by Chinese premier Li Keqiang as the initiative's "flagship project"—represents an ideal test case to assess how China is aiming to secure its investments abroad. The economic corridor running through Pakistan has by far the most advanced set of projects coming under the aegis of BRI. The level of investment in the official narrative has increased from $46 billion to $62 billion in recent years, although actual investment will likely be around $19 to $20 billion, including the so-called early-harvest projects already completed as part of the first phase of CPEC.2 Notwithstanding the vast amounts of economic and political capital that China has invested in Pakistan, however, an array of challenges persist. In 2018, three attacks to Chinese nationals, assets, and symbols sounded a powerful reminder of the risks that China faces in implementing its global ambitions. The most prominent of the three incidents occurred in November 2018, when a group of assailants attempted to enter the Chinese consulate in Karachi. The attackers belonged to the Fidayeen Majeed [End Page 5] Brigade—a China-focused cell recently established within the Balochistan Liberation Army—and they were prevented from entering the consulate's premises.3 Nevertheless, the attack was a clear warning of the threats that China faces in its global outreach, even from a country like Pakistan where perceptions of Beijing are largely favorable. This essay examines how China is cooperating with Pakistan to protect its investment under CPEC. It demonstrates that cooperation to secure BRI projects in Pakistan is articulated around a two-pronged strategy: reliance on the host nation's military, government, and private security contractors to safeguard China's interests; and increased fiber-optic connectivity to protect communications and the digital component of CPEC. Each of these two dimensions will be dissected, as well as some of the adjustments Beijing has made more recently to couple reliance on the Pakistani authorities with initiatives in the social sector that are aimed at mitigating criticism surrounding China's inroads in Pakistan. The Military and Government Efforts to Protect CPEC China's reliance on BRI host nations to ensure the security of Chinese workers and nationals has included a range of institutional actors within Pakistan. Since CPEC was officially launched in April 2015, the Pakistani authorities, both military and civilian, have collaborated with their Chinese counterparts to provide a safe environment for Chinese investments and those working to implement them. The Pakistan Army has played a pivotal role in the overall security framework of CPEC. Military-to-military cooperation is a key factor in the continuity of Sino-Pakistani relations, and the dynamics surrounding CPEC confirm this wider, historical trend. Over the years, China has ensured that the Pakistani military has had the capabilities and means to carry out its tasks, as well as those in China's interests. Since 2011, China has emerged as the major arms supplier to Pakistan. From 2013, when the first memoranda of understanding (MOUs) related to CPEC were signed, to 2018, the total value of arms transfers from China to Pakistan was $3.5 billion. To put this data into perspective, the United States, which is still Pakistan's second-largest supplier, transferred only $493 million in arms, [End Page 6] and Italy (third-largest) transferred $299 million.4 Looking at these figures, it should not come as a surprise that during a visit to Beijing in September 2018, the...

Introduction Jessica Keough (bio) In 2013, China's president Xi Jinping announced an initiative that would set the course for much of China's foreign policy toward its Eurasian neighbors. Consisting of two parts—an overland "belt" connecting China with Central Asia, Russia, South Asia, and Europe and a maritime "road" linking Chinese ports with those in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe—the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) envisions a vast network of railways, highways, ports, pipelines, and communication infrastructure spanning the Eurasian continent and facilitating trade, investment, and people-to-people exchange (see Figure 1). In 2015, Beijing announced a plan to develop six economic corridors to advance this initiative (see Figure 2). China's leadership has rallied behind BRI, pledging substantial investment, creating new financial institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Silk Road Fund, and making diplomatic commitments to countries along the proposed routes. To many observers, BRI appears to be an outline of China's ambitious new grand strategy, 1 but what do states in the region think of this initiative? The seven contributors to this Asia Policy roundtable seek to answer this question by examining how Asian states along this new Silk Road view BRI and its potential implications. Michael Clarke begins the roundtable with an essay that analyzes China's motivations and objectives. He concludes that BRI is motivated by Beijing's desire to resolve long-term domestic, economic, and geopolitical challenges by strengthening states in China's frontier regions, exporting Chinese capital and labor, and establishing an alternative to the current international order. BRI integrates these objectives into a strategy that furthers China's goal of returning to great-power status without provoking strong counterreactions. Andrew Small seeks to understand Pakistan's role in BRI through an examination of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Despite Pakistan and China's long history of an "all-weather friendship," previous joint infrastructure and economic projects have generally failed to deliver [End Page 66] Click for larger view View full resolution Figure 1. China's Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Source: "West China Seeks Fortune on Modern Silk Road," Xinhua, May 15, 2016 ≈ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-05/15/c_135360904.htm. Originally published in Chinese in Xinhua, 2014. Reprinted with minor changes from Nadège Rolland, China's Eurasia Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017), 49. [End Page 67] Click for larger view View full resolution Figure 2. The Six Economic Corridors of the Belt and Road Initiative Source: Hong Kong Trade Development Council Head Office, "The Belt and Road Initiative," January 21, 2016 ≈ http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-More-Information/obor/en/1/1X3CGF6L/1X0A36H1.htm. Reprinted from Rolland, China's Eurasia Century? 73. [End Page 68] on their rhetoric. Although both sides clearly stand to gain from CPEC and some progress has been made, long-standing challenges in Pakistan provide reason for skepticism that the project will in fact meet Beijing's goals. While not on board with BRI, India is closely watching the initiative, particularly CPEC. Harsh Pant and Ritika Passi argue in their essay that pressure is mounting on New Delhi to decide whether to remain on the sidelines. India is wary of the security implications of BRI, particularly for the contested area of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and for Indian Ocean ports and sea lanes; however, China's infrastructure development projects could be a boon that increases the region's economic interdependence and gives India leverage to shape the initiative from within. India thus faces challenging decisions as BRI unfolds. Russia, by contrast, has moved from caution to an embrace of BRI, at least for now. The initiative will expand China's presence not only in Central Asia, Russia's traditional sphere of influence, but also further westward in Turkey, the Middle East, and Europe. While Moscow recognizes this dilution of its own influence, Sebastien Peyrouse argues that Russia's economic crisis and the effects of Western sanctions have left...

The world population is growing, putting added pressure on scarce life-supporting resources of the Earth. Individuals and societies look for a better quality of services which implies compatible economic growth. Sustainable economic growth for the better financial health of communities is possible through the judicious employment of factors of production. Means of communication provide a platform for mutual business and trade where all benefit from each other’s expertise. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) wrapped in it fundamentally provides connectivity to facilitate interaction among communities and countries. Resource-scarce states can benefit from it according to their capacities for improving economic growth and social development compatible with international standards. Like every strategic initiative, there are misperceptions, misgivings and apprehensions about BRI as well; however, most pertain to what the other side is going to achieve. In the business world of competition and rivalry, customarily, any achievement by the other side (a competitor) is taken at the cost of oneself, thereby finding a reason to oppose it. Since the start of this initiative, there has been an abundance of write-ups from different stakeholders apprehending what China in BRI and Pakistan in CPEC are going to achieve. If the notion is reversed, so that instead of looking at it for the benefit it provides to the other side, looking at what it provides to you and others on merit, the issue can be resolved.

This paper aims to study the security of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in regional context, with special focus on China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).Security environment of Afghanistan still remains uncertain and volatile having a direct bearing on the security situation of Pakistan and CPEC. Contrary to expectations, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) continues to operate from its secure bases inside Afghanistan under the Taliban regime and expand its influence in the areas bordering Afghanistan. Indian opposition to CPEC is driven by multiple motives apart from being a perennial adversary of Pakistan and a strategic competitor of China. China’s central role in BRI and CPEC has ramifications from Indian perspective that is why it opposes BRI and CPEC. Bilateral relations of Pakistan and Iran has seen many ups and down, however, both countries have developed broad unanimity over Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Iran has indicated an interest in joining CPEC. BRI has further strengthened already deep ties between Pakistan and China. Following a qualitative approach and drawing on the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), this study underscores the security challenge for BRI in the context of regional security environment.

Introduction Nadège Rolland (bio) In recent years the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), previously known as the "One Belt, One Road" strategy, has emerged as the cornerstone of China's foreign policy under Xi Jinping. Presented as a cooperative endeavor motivated by China's willingness to bring economic prosperity, growth, and stability to its wider periphery, BRI nevertheless has more than one purpose. As part of its New Silk Road project launched in 2015, the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) has been studying BRI in detail over the last several years. We have unpacked its drivers, ambitions, and strategic implications.1 We have analyzed its possible impact on the Eurasian continental and maritime energy environment,2 described and assessed regional responses,3 underlined the challenges and uncertainties it faces,4 and participated in policymaking assessments of the initiative.5 This Asia Policy roundtable follows in the footsteps of these groundbreaking research activities, this time with the intention to shed light on BRI's military and security implications in South Asia. The roundtable has been made possible by the generous support of the Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security, which partnered with NBR on a new project launched in 2018 dedicated to examining how China's expanding interests along the belt and road affect its military and security calculations and shape its external security behavior. [End Page 2] As China's economic and political footprint expands along the continental Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, an increasing number of Chinese diplomats, businessmen, and workers are venturing into areas that were until now largely outside China's traditional reach. Along the belt and road, the security situation is often volatile due to insurgency and destabilizing spillovers from regional conflicts. How the Chinese military and security elite are trying to protect and secure China's interests along the new Silk Roads is one of the issues critical to BRI's sustainability and success. Nowhere is China's tentative response to BRI's security challenges more apparent than in South Asia. The significance of this geographic space is self-evident, as this subregion is where the continental "belt" meets the maritime "road" and connects three continents—Europe, Africa, and Asia—via land and the Indian Ocean, a crucial artery for international commerce and energy supplies. But it is also where BRI faces a whole gamut of serious security challenges, from traditional conflicts centered on territorial and border disputes, to potential naval competition with India, to nontraditional terrorist and religious insurgencies, to energy security challenges. Pakistan epitomizes most of the security challenges BRI faces. Using the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as a test case to assess how China attempts to secure its assets, Filippo Boni finds that the responsibility to protect Chinese citizens and assets is delegated to the Pakistani military and police forces, who have benefited from increased cooperation with their Chinese counterparts. Pakistan is also the only example of a South Asian country where Chinese private security companies operate so far. Meia Nouwens notes that the lack of either international or domestic regulations, combined with these companies' relative inexperience with operating in hostile environments, increases risks of miscalculation. Widening the geographic focus to the entire Indian Ocean, Nilanthi Samaranayake looks at China's first attempts in securing the Maritime Silk Road. Although Beijing's efforts still seem limited in scope and constricted by local and regional counterbalancing, the situation could change in the long run. It is precisely against the possibility of losing their strategic edge in the Indian Ocean to an expanded Chinese naval presence that both India and the United States should strengthen their countervailing response, argue Gurpreet Khurana and Arzan Tarapore. Considering the national security risks posed by China's expanded influence on its traditional periphery, India should promote military and geoeconomic [End Page 3] solutions, argues Khurana. Viewing BRI as an essential element of China's grand strategy, Tarapore advocates enhanced U.S. partnerships with regional states, with India at the core, and a comprehensive U.S. strategy that blurs the traditional economic and security fault lines (not unlike BRI itself). Taken together, the essays presented in this roundtable offer a...

Afghanistan and the Belt and Road Initiative:Hope, Scope, and Challenges Meena Singh Roy (bio) In September and October 2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping visited Central Asia and Southeast Asia, where he announced an initiative to jointly build the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. From the Chinese perspective, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an ambitious economic vision aimed at "cooperation among the countries along the Belt and Road" whereby they "work in concert and move towards the objectives of mutual benefit and common security."1 The BRI vision document emphasizes the great potential and space for cooperation among regional countries by promoting policy coordination and facilitating connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds. These have been identified as the initiative's five major goals. Since being announced in 2013, BRI has become the centerpiece of Xi's foreign policy. In May 2017, representatives from over 100 countries, including Afghanistan, attended the Belt and Road Forum, at which 68 countries and international organizations signed cooperation agreements with China. Xi explained that China hopes to "find new driving forces for growth, create a new platform for global development, and re-balance economic globalization."2 This essay examines Afghanistan's high expectations for BRI and Chinese perceptions of the country's potential role in the initiative. The essay concludes by discussing the challenges that Kabul faces in realizing the benefits of participation in this ambitious connectivity project. Afghanistan's Expectations for BRI From Afghanistan's perspective, BRI is a welcome project. The Afghan government has shown interest and already confirmed its participation [End Page 103] in the initiative. Highlighting the importance of this megaproject, Deputy Foreign Minister Hekmat Khalil Karzai said that the "economic development process along the Silk Road will reshape the international development order that has been centered in our region and carries great significance for human development in the 21st century."3 For Afghans, this initiative is a very important step toward improving regional cooperation and regional and interregional connectivity, which complements Kabul's long-standing policy of promoting regional integration and economic cooperation. With an aim to advance transnational projects, Kabul initiated the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan in 2005, and in 2011 the Regional Cooperation Directorate was established in the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In March 2017, Finance Minister Eklil Hakimi stated that Afghanistan has already aligned most of its domestic plans with BRI.4 The government believes that the initiative will provide an opportunity for Afghanistan to once again become an "Asian transit and trade roundabout" connecting South Asia to Central Asia and East Asia to West Asia, thus bringing economic benefits not only to Afghanistan but to the entire region. Specifically, Afghan leaders argue that the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, the Five Nations Railway, and several gas pipeline projects can be linked to other projects under China's grand connectivity initiative.5 In addition, since October 2016, Afghanistan has expressed interest in joining the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and its ambassador to Pakistan, Omar Zakhilwal, has already extended Afghan support for CPEC. Both Pakistan and China seem open to this possibility, but the logistical question of how to extend CPEC into Afghanistan remains unanswered. The proponents of Afghanistan joining CPEC in particular and BRI in general have argued that participating in this megaproject will bring the following benefits to the country. First, the new infrastructure within Pakistan could give Afghan businesses and investors access to the consumer market in South Asia, thus reducing the cost of imports and increasing exports to the region. This could help Afghanistan enhance its [End Page 104] trade with regional countries, thereby stabilizing its economy. In 2015, Pakistan was the top export destination for Afghanistan ($392 million), followed by India ($277 million). Similarly, Pakistan emerged as the top origin for imports, with trade amounting to $1.95 billion, followed by China ($587 million) and India ($560 million). So far Afghanistan has been exporting goods like carpets, rugs, dried fruits, and medical plants but not copper, iron ore, and other natural resources. BRI is expected to offer the opportunity for Afghanistan to export these and other valuable resources to...

Having realized that India’s growth and prosperity is connected with the development of the South Asian region, successive Indian prime ministers have attempted to give due importance to India’s neighbours and continue to engage with them, despite the ups and downs they have experienced in such bilateral ties. But in this endeavour, Pakistan remains a difficult nut to crack and the challenges are further deepened with the commencement of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is one of the six core economic corridors under the China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and is regarded as a fate-changer/game-changer for Pakistan. The CPEC was launched in April 2015, with China pledging to invest around US$46 billion in Pakistan (enhanced to US$62 billion in 2017) and providing preferential loans in key sectors. However, this corridor has been outrightly opposed by India on the grounds that it threatens its sovereignty and security, although, there are several studies by policymakers, academics, and business groups that analyse India's position and response to CPEC. However, there are fewer studies (from an Indian perspective) on the prospects of CEPC for both China and Pakistan, as well as the impact of CEPC on India's strategy. At the same time, scholars and policymakers have yet to undertake studies on identifying areas for India's (at least restricted) engagement in BRI/CPEC. Nonetheless, this study contends that India must reconsider its CPEC responses and plans, and China must address India's concerns in order for both countries to participate in the BRI. Subsequently, Pakistan's economic expansion will benefit both India and China, as well as the region.In this context, the twin objective of the chapter is to: first, examine the socio-economic/geostrategic prospects of CPEC for both China and Pakistan and its implications for India. Second, analyse India’s responses so far and to identify the viable policy options for India to overcome the CPEC dilemma. In order to understand the dynamics of CPEC and its implications for India, the study attempts to argue from a realistic and liberal international relations perspective. The methodology consisted of interpretive view focusing on the political, economic, and strategic aspects of CPEC from 2015 to till now. The study is deductive in nature as the economic, political, and security-related aspects are reviewed, analysing the perspectives of Pakistan and China as well as India. Subsequently, it examines the qualitative and narrative characteristics of the data, and uses exploratory research methodology to enhance the understanding of the strategic importance of CPEC for both China and Pakistan. Finally, it concludes: (a) Although China and Pakistan portray CPEC as a key to deepening bilateral relations and not undermining India's regional interests, it is clear that the corridor endangers India's sovereignty, strategic interests in South Asia and beyond Afghanistan, and weakens India's regional role, with China gaining an advantage through the BRI. (b) India's counter-CPEC initiatives have limited impact, as India is unable to give an alternative to BRI because of limited resources, and South Asian countries are more inclined towards China than India. In this sense, India and China might look at the possibility of taking a selective approach to projects linking Iran, Afghanistan, and other Central Asian countries to the CPEC, which would be a win–win situation for both countries.KeywordsBRIChinaPakistanIndiaCPEC

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) have so far developed the narrative of bringing prosperity and peace; particularly in the welfare context of Afro-Asian population in Indian Ocean littoral states and enhanced cooperation among countries in Asia, Europe and Africa. The grey areas needs to be analysed with Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) for the overall discourse of maritime. Thus, this study examined the emerging role of BRI viz-a-viz trade opportunities and challenges for Pakistan and China by employing A’WOT method. Results reveal that the successful BRI and CPEC endeavours will open up a door for future investment, prosperity and sustainable development in Indian Ocean Region (IOR). However, Pakistan has higher ratio of threats compare to China and relative to the opportunities considering the weaknesses due to internal and external factors. Maritime trade under BRI has success potential due to geo-strategic location of Pakistan and weaknesses can be avoided in a complete decision support manner with appropriate policy and strategic arrangements.

Driven by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China and Pakistan as all-weather strategic partners announced a big move to build the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in 2015, aiming to link Pakistan’s Gwadar Port to China’s Xinjiang autonomous region. CPEC leads two countries into economic cooperation in critical areas including manufacture, energy, logistics and transport. The Belt and Road initiatives (BRI) project could bring economic avenues to Pakistan and foster regional and cross-regional economic growth as well as trade integration between Central Asia, South Asia, West Asia and East Asia. This paper not only makes a theoretical analysis of BRI and CPEC but also explores the reason why CPEC may succeed from the perspectives of the balanced growth development theory and the neoclassical growth theory. Theoretically, openness and massive capital are key factors for less developed economies to transfer into a sustainable growth state. However, these countries are disadvantageous in both openness and capital funds. Therefore, an external big push of massive investment is needed for them. Only through investing simultaneously in most complementary industries and regions, can they make economies to step into the growing path, and then to grow sustainably. Once the big push ignites the growth engine, economies acquire advantages of catch-up mechanism and converge to steady state. Therefore, CPEC focusing on aid-for-trade as well as substantial infrastructure development is capable of boosting economic prosperities for both China and Pakistan. In addition to theoretical analysis, this article identifies different types of socio-political impediments against BRI and CPEC, ranging from environmental aspects to socio-political structures. Pakistan has long been struggling with socio-political factors: low literacy rate, turbulent political situation, terrorist attacks, crimes, wars and corruption. All these negative factors pose essential challenges for transnational investment and infrastructure projects.

The use of special economic zones (SEZs) has played a vital role in the rapid industrialization of China. Shenzhen is largely regarded as a success story regarding implementation of SEZ idea, where a small fishing village has been converted into a thriving economic hub. However, China, owing to its rapidly increasing competitiveness and advance towards high-tech industries, has decided to relocate some of the industries outside its boundaries. Thus, the mega-agenda of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launched by Chinese President, Xi Jinping in 2015. The BRI comprises six economic corridors connecting China with diverse countries worldwide. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is considered to be a flagship under the umbrella of the BRI. Under the CPEC, a window of opportunity has opened for Pakistan where the country can draw lessons from the Chinese experiences of rapid industrialization in the form of SEZs. In this regard, the SEZ mechanism remains an effective and significant tool for Pakistan to transform its national industrial outlook. However, the pragmatic practice of developing SEZs under the CPEC is not visible as yet, largely because of the internal and external challenges faced by Pakistan. This chapter tries to understand the general concept of the SEZs, their significance under the CPEC and the BRI, and the parameters of the SEZ mechanism with a Pakistani perspective. Apart from this, the study also explores multiple challenges, which are the major impediments to the successful establishment of the SEZ mechanism in Pakistan, by using the qualitative method and interview technique.

For the last two decades, China has been advancing rapidly in multiple sectors compared to the years of progress before 2000. Despite opposing views from the U.S. regarding the progress of China, it is a fact that China is the rising power in the current globalized world. Beijing applies many strategies and programs to achieve success and the world's predominant status. In continuation of its plans, China introduced a global connectivity and development program, namely One Belt, One Road (OBOR), renamed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in 2013. The BRI is the biggest project in human history by a single country. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)is a flagship project of BRI. It is considered the testing ground for the initiative's success. The Gwadar port project under the CPEC plays the role of a gateway for China toward Central Asia and the Middle East. China can export and import its goods quickly via this shorter and cheaper route. Therefore, the success of the CPEC keeps much significance for Beijing and Islamabad. Likewise, CPEC will prove the authenticity, reliability and credibility of BRI. For this reason, China is trying its best to complete the CPEC within a projected time. However, many countries raise questions about the authenticity and reliability of CPEC and BRI. However, despite negative connotations, the project's progress is evident. Keywords: CPEC, BRI, Realism, Dominance, NSR, FDI, Energy, Security.

Pakistan’s geographical location is ideal for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Project, and it formally recognizes as an iconic model of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) plan. This corridor is laid at the cross intersection of three regions of economic growth include: China, Central Asian Republics and South Asia. It plays a vital role of inter-connectivity between these three regions, where three billions of inhabitants live, which is roughly half of the world population. The central argument of the paper is sternly conceptual and based on the subsequent arguments: foremost, the foundation of CPEC project is a green signal for the regional connectivity, mutual cooperation, economic growth and stability of the entire region of South and Central Asia. Secondly, the topographical position of Pakistan has an incredible potential for corridor development and manipulation process. Thirdly, due to the iconic model of belt and road initiative plan, the CPEC corridor has broad potential for regional economic growth because of shared boundaries and cross intersection position with China, CARs and South Asia. Finally, with the copious fruitful opportunities, this project facades somber challenges internally and outwardly. Hence, this study uses a positive-sum logic to analyze central argument and also discusses the policy inputs that may be prolific for regional growth and reforms of the project.

Pakistan is one of the key countries in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) where the latter is implementing a multibillion-dollar, multiyear investment plan known as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). A collection of projects aimed at developing energy, industry and communication infrastructure, costing over USD 46 billion, CPEC is expected to contribute significantly to socio-economic development and poverty reduction in Pakistan. The main research question is, while implementing development projects in Pakistan, to what extent China adheres to its avowed principles of international development cooperation comprising features such as mutual respect, non-conditionality, equality, building local capacity and addressing actual needs of partner countries. Based mainly on the analysis of primary data collected during fieldwork in Pakistan, this research explores the extent to which the official narrative guides and influences the actual practice of China’s development cooperation on the ground. Although still evolving, the BRI and its constituent the CPEC, which is an investment-grant-loan model of financing in Pakistan, is an example of South-South Cooperation (SSC): the form of international development cooperation whereby “two or more developing countries pursue their individual or collective development through cooperative exchange of knowledge, skills, resources and technical expertise” (UNDP, 2007, p. 1). For the analysis of CPEC-related Chinese investment in Pakistan, this study uses an analytical framework developed by researchers from the South Africa chapter of the Network of Southern Think Tanks (NeST), a group of key research institutions from various developing countries dedicated to generating standardised, systematic and clearly comparable knowledge on SSC (Besharati & Rawhani, 2016; Besharati, Rawhani, & Rios, 2017). Established in 2015, and then refined and finalised in 2017 after a number of expert group meetings and field-based SSC case studies, the framework operationalises various conceptual issues related to the quality and development effectiveness of SSC. The framework, which is discussed later in some detail, comprises five dimensions and a set of 20 indicators. The overall framework and associated dimensions and indicators not only offer valuable parameters to assess the quality and effectiveness of SSC, but these are also closely related to the key principles and features of China’s foreign aid policy. The five key elements of the analytical framework are inclusive national ownership, horizontality, self-reliance and sustainability, accountability and transparency and development efficiency. Within this framework and associated parameters, this research examines the China-Pakistan development partnership under CPEC and explores the extent to which SSC principles are practiced. By systematically examining SSC in the form of Chinese investment and development cooperation projects in Pakistan, this study contributes to the limited body of academic literature on Chinese development cooperation with its key South Asian ally.