Abstract
AbstractNoncognitivism, in its primary sense, is a claim about moral acceptance. However, as standardly developed, it is a part of a syndrome of ideas that include negative and positive claims about moral semantics. Standard noncognitivists are nonfactualists in that they deny that the content of a moral sentence is a moral proposition. Standard noncognitivists are expressivists in that they claim that the content of a moral sentence is its use to express a noncognitive attitude. Standard noncognitivism faces serious difficulties. In its most transparently noncognitivist form, an atomistic reduction of moral content to the expression of noncognitive attitudes, it faces an unanswerable dilemma. In a form that avoids this, the position is deprived of the means of demonstrating its nonfactualist and hence noncognitivist standing. This chapter examines these difficulties.
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