2.9 Defending the Creation of Values

Abstract

AbstractNietzsche claims that the philosopher’s task is to create values. Authors 1 [Henning Ottmann] and 2 [Martin Saar] interpret this in the most literal sense: philosophers are to confer value on things. 1.1 criticizes Nietzsche on that basis; 1.2 suggests that we ignore his pose as creator or prophet of new values and focus on more reasonable points he makes about values. No one defends value creation (VC) in the exact sense in which 1.1 interprets it, but other authors take the obvious objections to it as reasons to seek a different account of what Nietzsche means by it. I do this explicitly in 1.9, and others do so implicitly in their contributions. Here I focus on the criticisms of Nietzsche offered by 1.1 and how they might be countered by 1.3 [Manuel Dries]’s interpretation of what Nietzsche means by VC. I explain why 1.3’s interpretation is not sufficient, but how it might be supplemented by 1.9. I also use my account to answer 1.6 [James Porter]’s challenge concerning the limits of the affirmation of life.