1989 and Post-Cold War Policymaking: Were the “Wrong” Lessons Learned from the Fall of Communism?

Abstract

Twenty years after the events of 1989, most American academics and policymakers continue to see the end of the Cold War as a victory for the United States. This Cold War “triumphalism” is based on a number of assumptions which have, in turn, served as important framing devices for US foreign policy. This chapter argues that the “wrong lessons” were learned from the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe. These lessons were based on a misreading of both Cold War history, in general, and its endgame, more specifically. This chapter outlines ten such lessons and explores the ways in which they were used to legitimate policies of regime change from above after 9/11. In this way, we can see a direct line between Berlin in 1989 and Baghdad in 2003, one driven by the hubris of both US policymakers and intellectuals.