美國政府對台非軍事政策再議之決策過程(1949 年1 月 21 日至1950 年6 月25 日)

Abstract

In the spring of 1949, the United States was encountered with the collapse of the Chinese Nationalist government in the Civil War and pondered how to keep the Chinese communists away from taking over Taiwan. Due to the disparity between the strength and global obligations, the United States government decided to provide Taiwan with political and economic assistances. However, the controversy over the strategic value of Taiwan remained heated in the U.S. government until the outbreak of the War in Korea. The thesis applies Graham Allison’s three models, namely, rational actor model (RAM), Organizational behavior model (OBM), and Governmental politics model (GPM), to explore the decision-making process of reappraising U.S. nonmilitary policy toward Taiwan. Three hypotheses are derived from the theoretical discussion. Therefore, the main purpose of this thesis is to analyze the U.S. decision-making process of reappraising the nonmilitary policy toward Taiwan from January 21, 1949, when Dean Acheson assumed the post as Secretary of State, to June 24, 1950, when the Korean War broke out. From the perspective of RAM, the U.S. government favored the wedge strategy to contain the Soviet Union, thereby avoiding any move enraging the Chinese communists. As a result, the U.S. nonmilitary policy toward Taiwan was adopted until the outbreak of the Korean War. From the perspective of OBM, the State Department was in favor of the wedge strategy and dominated the decision-making process. Accordingly, the U.S. nonmilitary policy toward Taiwan was adhered regardless of constant challenges from within and outside the State Department, such as the China bloc, the Defense Department and the State Department’s Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. From the perspective of GPM, Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, was firmly convinced the value and likelihood of the wedge strategy. And, most importantly, he maintained close relations with President Harry S. Truman. Consequently, he dominated the decision-making process and defeated all challenges of the U.S. nonmilitary policy toward Taiwan, particularly from Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense, and Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. Judging from the aforementioned analysis, the main theme of the thesis is that the United Stated decided to adhere to the nonmilitary policy toward Taiwan until the Korean War broke our because the strategic value of Taiwan was not as important as that of the wedge strategy on Communist China. The successful testing of the three hypotheses proves that Allison’s three models can be applicable in the case study of this thesis.