Abstract
Abstract : The lynchpin of proper strategic response in time of developing crisis Is not forces available, target sets or diplomatic access. The key Is understanding who makes the key decisions and how those decisions are made at the national level. The national security decisionmaking of a nation is the centerpiece of its strategic vision, forces and conduct. It is arguably the single most Important element In predicting national behavior. This paper examines the national security decisionmaking of the former Soviet Union and Israel relative to their respective Invasions or Afghanistan in 1979 and Lebanon in 1982. The study analyzes the respective national security decisionmaking systems, the strategic setting for both invasions, the decisions to Invade and the outcomes. In both cases, Imbalanced Information and constricted interaction between key personalities and factions short-circuited the decisionmaking process. Both nations, not recognizing the Inherent flaws In their systems that eliminated institutional checks and balances, made bad decisions based on bad policy. American and allied national security decisionmakers should heed the lessons derived from these cases.
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