Abstract
Abstract This chapter first recapitulates the history of Indian and Pakistani approaches to nuclear-weapon capability, leading up to the 1998 explosive tests. It considers the significance of the 1999 Kargil crisis and the 2001–2 mobilization stand-off, and notes the damaging Pakistani episode of A. Q. Khan's ‘nuclear black market’. It summarizes what is publicly known about the nuclear doctrines and operational capabilities of the two countries, and notes the complication of achieving war-prevention stability amid the asymmetries between them. It observes that recent relaxations in tension, as over Kashmir, are not irreversible, and posits a set of principles that might help to enhance stability and reduce costs in their deterrent interface. Finally, it looks at their relationship to the global non-proliferation regime, including the controversial US/India deal on nuclear energy.
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