10 First-Order Logic, Incongruism, and Anti-Formalism

Abstract

The most widely used version of modern formal logic in contemporary analytic philosophy is standard first-order predicate logic. This chapter explains a set of propositions with regard to which the author defends incongruism (vis-a-vis first-order logic) and anti-formalism. It offers an overview of standard first-order logic. The chapter defends the relevant version of incongruism by proposing four criteria for amenability to first-order analysis, and arguing that divine nature doctrines fail to meet at least one of these criteria. It gives two formalistic responses to this version of incongruism. The chapter also defends the relevant version of anti-formalism by arguing that a non-formalistic response to incongruism is more adequate than the formalistic responses. Finally, it shows that anti-formalism is to be preferred to formalism when it comes to the conceptual analysis of divine nature doctrines. Keywords: anti-formalism; divine nature doctrines; first-order logic; incongruism; non-formalistic response