Abstract

With the enormous growth and various applications of private brands, national brand manufacturers are confronted with a dilemmatic situation. That is, paradoxically, some manufacturers have come to produce private brands of retailers which are potential competitors to their own brands. This study reveals why manufacturers with their own brands let themselves do the consignment production of retailers' private brands although those private brands may become strong competitors of their own brands and then investigates the condition in which manufacturers may benefit from such consignment production. Through an analysis of a game theoretical model assuming a monopoly market, the present study presents the theoretical backgrounds and provides new insights about consignment production of manufacturer with its own brand for retailer's private brand. First, such consignment production can play a role in mitigating the loss in the consignee manufacturer's own brand sales caused by the private brand in the competitive environment. Second, the effectiveness of such role is affected by the quality of the private brand produced under consignment. In other word, only if the consignee manufacturer keeps the quality of the private brand low, the manufacturer can maintain the benefit from its own brand. In addition, a consigner retailer needs to consider the final objective of launching its private brand, when it chooses its consignee manufacturer of the brand. Finally, a manufacturer with its own brand may consider consignment production as not merely an unavoidable option compelled by a retailer's power but a reasonable strategic choice to reduce the risk from competition.

Full Text
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