跨流域调水供应链合作博弈模型 Cooperative Game Model for the Inter-Basin Water Diversion Supply Chain

Abstract

跨流域调水工程运营中往往缺乏有效的合作运营机制，导致参与主体与工程整体的运营目标相偏离。论文从非合作博弈视角和合作博弈视角，分别构建了不同联盟组合下跨流域调水供应链非合作博弈模型、基于核仁、弱核仁、比例核仁方法和Shapley值方法的跨流域调水供应链合作博弈模型，并进行了对比数值分析，在此基础上，探讨了跨流域调水供应链合作运营机制。研究结果表明：(1) 基于核仁、弱核仁、比例核仁方法和Shapley值方法的合作博弈下跨流域调水供应链及其成员的运营绩效均不低于非合作博弈情形，实现了参与各方利益的帕累托改进。(2) 由于非合作博弈下系统供应商的“先动优势”，基于核仁、弱核仁、比例核仁方法和Shapley值方法的利益分配方案下，系统供应商获得的利润高于本地分销商和外地分销商。(3) 基于比例核仁方法的供应链利益分配方案下本地分销商的利润并没有改善，该方案下的合作联盟不稳定。(4) 基于核仁方法和弱核仁方法的供应链利益分配方案体现的是更加平均主义的思想，为跨流域调水工程提供了一种更为公平的合作运营机制；而基于Shapley值方法的供应链利益分配方案体现的是功利主义原则，为跨流域调水工程提供了一种更为高效的合作运营机制。 The operation management of inter-basin water diversion (IBWT) project is usually lack of efficient cooperative operations mechanism, which leads to the bias between the operation goal of the whole project and the operations goal of the participants. From both the perspectives of non-cooperative game and cooperative game, non-cooperative game models under different coalition combination and cooperative game models based on methods of nucleolus weak nucleolus, proportional nucleolus and Shapley value for the IBWT supply chain are developed, respectively. The corresponding numerical analysis is implemented, and the cooperative operations mechanism for the IBWT supply chain is also discussed in this article. This study suggests that: i) the operations performance of the IBWT supply chain and its members under the cooperative game based on the methods of nucleolus, weak nucleolus, proportional nucleolus and Shapley value, are no less than that under the non-cooperative game, and participant’s benefits achieve Pareto improvement. ii) Due to the water supplier’s advantage of “first-move”, water supplier gains more profit than the local distributor and the external distributor under the profits allocation scheme based on the methods of nucleolus, weak nucleolus, proportional nucleolus and Shapley value. iii) The local distributor’s profit is not improved under the profits allocation scheme based on the proportional nucleolus method, and the cooperative alliance is not stale under this allocation scheme. iv) The profits allocation scheme based on the methods of nucleolus and weak nucleolus shows the thinking of equalitarianism, providing a more equitable cooperative-operation mechanism for the IBWT project; the profits allocation scheme based on the method of Shapley shows the principle of utilitarianism, providing a more efficient cooperative-operation mechanism for the IBWT project.