Реализация скидочной политики на дефицитных B2B рынках: маркетинговый ход или ценовая дискриминация?

Abstract

Modern research of B2B markets focuses on various aspects of information and economic interaction of market participants, but most often the features of marketing strategies in the field of promoting goods / services and building marketing communications are analyzed in order to increase customer satisfaction and loyalty. The issues of effective pricing and the implementation of discount policy as a tool to stimulate sales in B2B markets have not been practically studied. The variability in the application of seller pricing policy instruments in B2B markets under conditions of a limited number of buyers can have a significant impact on the intensity of competition in the market and, as a consequence, lead to a change in the market structure, its transformation and loss of balance. Therefore, the pricing system in non-equilibrium, in particular, shortage markets, in which the inefficient use of discount mechanisms by sellers can take the form of price discrimination of buyers due to the increased market power of the seller, is of considerable scientific and practical interest. This article, being a continuation of the discourse started by the authors on price discrimination in scarce markets, published in No. 3 of the journal Modern Competition, and is devoted to the study of the feasibility of using discounts in equilibrium and scarce B2B markets. At the end of the series of articles on price discrimination in scarce markets [1], the authors intend to publish a third article, which will examine the case of a shortage solid-rolled wheel market in Russia in 2018-2019 from the standpoint of assessing the feasibility of preserving discount programs for certain categories of buyers in the specified oligopolistic B2B market.