Abstract

This paper is an exploratory study that seeks to explain the dynamics between North Korea's traditional ‘Suryong system (수령제)’ (in which the supreme leader is supposed to hold more power than all elites combined) and the growing prominence of the Korean Workers’ Party's (KWP) Political Bureau(Politburo for short) under Kim Jong Un's rule. Certain observers concluded that the ‘Suryong system’ became weaker since Kim Jong Un had assumed power. While this view is not widely accepted, Kim Jong Un did launch a process aimed at restoring and reinforcing the institutional politics of the KWP - a peculiar initiative, since the institutionalization of politics might potentially limit the personal power of the supreme leader. This study seeks to explain this paradox by analyzing the relations between Kim Jong Un and the lower - ranking KWP leaders. By analyzing the changing composition of the KWP Politburo in the framework of Milan Svolik's “power-sharing theory,” the author argues that the fundamentals of the Suryong system have remained unchanged under Kim Jong Un's rule. Since the 8th Party Congress (2021), the KWP Politburo has been dominated by the ruling coalition fostered by Kim Jong Un. However, his co-leaders seem to have been his subordinates, rather than his equal partners. Kim was able to arbitrarily reorganize the composition of his ruling coalition, and frequently change the status of other Politburo members as he saw fit. In Kim Jong Un's Politburo, practices like ‘jumping promotion,’ demotion, and reinstatement of former members have been far more common than in other Communist one-party regimes. Applying Svolik's concepts and terms to the North Korean scene, the author concludes that Kim Jong Un's status as dictator is already ‘established,’ rather than ‘contested.’

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