Abstract

The paper considers transformation processes going on in the Russian Imperial Army from the middle of 1850s after the diplomatic and military defeat in the Eastern (Crimean) War against the coalition of European states. The author outlines the measures undertaken by the Government and Military Ministry in order to cut down the number of personnel in military units, formation of necessary legislative background to regulate the status of a military man on vacation outside the military unit. Special attention focuses on the attempts of the Russian Army to transform the principles of regular units formation, in particular improvement of officer personnel. The paper shows the way former soldiers and officers used to be employed in civil life and how provincial and local authorities facilitated it offering them jobs in the structures of aristocratic and rural management. Imperial military forces reformation resulted in the social structure of towns, cities and villages, the increased number of former military men influenced their relations with local population.Maintenance of a big army is proved to be a sufficient expenditure from the state budget so striving to make the correspondence between quantity and costs has been of top importance. The Russian Imperial Army of the early 19th century during the reign on Nikolai the First where the number of the military and the term of their service were the priority of the army construction was an excellent example, and serfdom was a social basis. The Eastern (Crimean) War made clear that such army was not effective and the number of soldiers was not a crucial advantage in front of contemporary armament and organization of the Europeans. As a result, the number of the allies defeated the Russians. Thus, the historic practice of quick army reformation (reduction) may serve an example for the Ukrainian military forces when the external threats disappear and there arises a necessity of transformation according to up-to-date optimal models of European armies.Military conflict between the Russian Empire and European countries in the middle of the 19th century exposed the drawbacks in the Russian military forces. The vacation system and formation of emergency and reserve troops during 20-50ies were rather effective maintaining the army in the proper combat readiness and preserving its necessary number. Hence, the Crimean War disclosed several key reasons of false military strategy based on serfdom. First, weak reserves and burdensome vast number of local troops not meant for war. Second, the serfdom prevented the reduction of service terms and training enough number of the military for reserves formation. Third, during active military actions it was impossible to reduce the number of local troops by recruiting them into the army regiments as far as they were used to powerfully support the serfdom in the rears. Therefore the army reformation reflected thorough social and economic shifts in the Russian state mechanism. Anachronistic serfdom evidently backed off all spheres of life. The crucial changes in the military forces did not strengthen the defensive potential of the country but served to prepare for new conquering wars as an instrument of Russian imperial politics in the 19th century.

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