הפעלת הצבא לשבירת שביתות נהגי הקטרים והימאים בשנת 1951

Abstract

In the second half of 1951 the State of Israel used the army to break up two strikes: the locomotive drivers’ strike and the seamen’s strike. In contrast to the latter, the locomotive drivers’ strike has been neglected by historical memory and ignored in historical research. Research devoted to the seamen’s strike has been carried out in isolation from other strikes during this period and presents it—mistakenly—as a unique case. As a result, it has been interpreted in the context of ideological and political confrontations, ignoring the fact that the government’s response to the strike was part of its broader approach to labor relations. This article will claim that in view of the proximity of the strikes and the similarity of the government’s responses, the seamen’s strike should be understood in light of the locomotive drivers’ strike, an approach that suggests a different interpretation of the strike. An analysis of the two strikes in sequence reveals that in the early years of Israeli statehood, Mapai had a policy of using the army to break up strikes, which was abandoned only after it had gained experience in dealing with them.